Read 3 of 5
Price wars and predation
Can a dominant firm drive rivals out by pricing below cost, and how does the law tell?
Predatory pricing is the most aggressive form of strategic deterrence: deliberately losing money to drive out a rival or scare off entrants, then raising prices once the market is clear.
This reading asks when such a strategy makes sense, why game theory is skeptical of it, and how competition law tries to separate it from the low prices that competition is supposed to produce.
3.1
How predation is supposed to work
has three phases.
- The price war. The predator cuts its price below its own cost, so that a rival or entrant loses money.
- Exit. The rival leaves the market, or potential entrants decide not to come in.
- . The predator raises its price above the competitive level and recovers its losses, and more.
Every phase is costly or uncertain for the predator. During the war, the predator usually loses more than the prey, because it sells more units at the loss-making price. Exit isn't guaranteed. And recoupment requires that the high prices afterward don't simply attract new entrants.
3.2
Why backward induction is skeptical
Suppose the prey understands the plan. It knows that the predator will stop the war as soon as fighting no longer pays, and that a war is costly for the predator. If the prey can borrow to survive the war, it can wait the predator out. Knowing this, the predator shouldn't start. It's the entry game again: once the rival is in, sharing the market usually beats fighting.
The argument extends to many markets. Picture an incumbent operating in 20 towns, facing an entrant in each in turn. In the last town, there are no future entrants to impress, so the incumbent accommodates. In the second-to-last town, the incumbent knows it will accommodate in the last, so fighting now can't scare anyone, and it accommodates again. Backward induction unravels the whole chain: the incumbent accommodates everywhere. This is the chain-store paradox. Like the centipede game in Week 6, it's logically sound and not quite how people behave.
3.3
When predation can work
Predation becomes possible when an assumption of the skeptical argument fails.
- Deep pockets. If the prey can't borrow, because lenders can't tell a temporary price war from a doomed business, a richer predator can outlast it.
- Reputation. If entrants aren't sure the incumbent is a rational accommodator, perhaps because some incumbents genuinely fight, then fighting early on builds a reputation that deters later entrants. A firm in many markets has more to gain from that reputation. This is the repeated-game logic of Week 6 at work.
- Signaling. A low price may convince the prey that the market or the predator's cost is worse for it than it really is.
Two cases show how hard predation is to pin down.
- Qualcomm and Icera. In July 2019 the European Commission fined Qualcomm €242 million for selling 3G baseband chipsets below cost to two large customers, Huawei and ZTE, between 2009 and 2011, with the aim of eliminating Icera, a small rival. The General Court upheld the finding in 2024 and trimmed the fine to about €239 million; Qualcomm has appealed again.
- Amazon and Diapers.com. Amazon cut its prices on diapers sharply in 2009 and 2010, according to Brad Stone's account of the episode by as much as 30%, while Quidsi, the owner of Diapers.com, was growing fast. Quidsi agreed to sell to Amazon in November 2010 for about $545 million. Internal Amazon emails released by a US congressional committee in 2020 described a plan to weaken Diapers.com, but no court or regulator has found that Amazon priced predatorily.
A third case is a good discussion question. For years, ride-hailing companies funded by venture capital charged fares below their costs in many cities. Was that predation, an investment in building a network, or both? What would recoupment look like?
3.4
Predation and the law
Low prices are what competition is supposed to deliver, so competition law has to separate predation from vigorous price-cutting, and the cost of a mistake runs both ways. Courts and agencies look for some combination of three things.
- Market power. A firm without it can't hope to recoup.
- Prices below an appropriate measure of cost. In the EU, prices below average variable cost are presumed abusive for a dominant firm. US courts require below-cost prices and a dangerous probability of recoupment.
- Harm to competition, not just to a competitor.
In Australia, the misuse-of-market-power provision, section 46 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010, was rewritten in 2017. A firm with a substantial degree of market power must not engage in conduct that has the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition. Below-cost pricing is judged under that general test; the earlier provision aimed specifically at predatory pricing was repealed. The cases show both outcomes. The ACCC lost its predatory-pricing case against Boral in the High Court in 2003, because the court found Boral lacked substantial market power in the Melbourne concrete-block market. In 2010 Cabcharge paid $14 million in penalties after admitting contraventions that included supplying taxi meters below cost.
For a manager, the lesson is double. Don't count on a rival's threat of predation, which is costly and rarely credible. And if your firm is dominant, deep price cuts aimed at a rival carry legal risk as well as cost.
Summary