Read 4 of 5

Strategies for entrants

How can a newcomer get in without provoking a fight it would lose, or persuade customers to rely on it?

Entrants have strategic moves too. One is to make customers trust that the entrant's position won't be used against them. Another is to come in small enough that the incumbent prefers to leave the entrant alone.

This reading looks at both: Intel's second-source licenses, and the judo strategy of Kiwi Airlines and Red Bull.

4.1

The trust game

A firm with a breakthrough product can face a different entry problem: its customers fear its power. In 1978 Intel introduced the 8086 microprocessor. Computer makers (OEMs) that designed their machines around it would be locked in. Once they had committed, Intel could raise the price.

Write it as a game. The OEMs move first: adopt the 8086 or don't. If they don't adopt, both sides earn 2. If they adopt, Intel prices high (OEMs 0, Intel 10) or low (5 each).

Each end node lists Intel's profit, then the OEMs'. Click a branch at every decision node to solve it from the end.

After adoption, Intel prices high, 10 against 5. The OEMs anticipate it and don't adopt. Both earn 2, though both would earn 5 if Intel could promise to price low. A promise alone isn't credible.

4.2

Giving up power to gain trust

Intel's answer was to license other chipmakers to produce compatible chips, so that customers had second sources. With competitors making the same chip, a high price would win Intel only 3, against 5 from a low price. Second sourcing makes the low price Intel's best response.

Intel decides whether to license before the OEMs decide. Each end node lists Intel's profit, then the OEMs'.

With licenses, the OEMs adopt and Intel prices low, earning 5. Without licenses, Intel earns 2. Giving up market power is the profitable move, because it's the only way to make the low price credible to customers who must commit first.

The history is close to this. When IBM chose Intel's 8088, a version of the 8086, for its first personal computer in 1981, IBM's purchasing rules required a second source. Intel signed a technology exchange agreement with AMD in 1982, and other manufacturers also produced the chip: around ten in all. Intel accepted a smaller share of a much larger market. Once the x86 had become the industry standard, customers no longer needed reassurance, and Intel kept later generations, starting with the 386, largely to itself. AMD's challenge to that decision went to arbitration in 1987 and through the California courts before a settlement in 1995. A commitment that is worth making early, when buyers must be persuaded to commit, may not be worth renewing later.

4.3

The judo strategy

A small entrant can't win a head-on fight with a large incumbent. A avoids the fight: move quickly into a position the incumbent doesn't value much, stay flexible, and use the incumbent's size against it. Matching a small entrant's low price often means cutting prices to all of the incumbent's own customers, which costs the incumbent far more than it saves.

Kiwi Airlines, a low-fare carrier, considered entering Delta's Atlanta to New Orleans route. Delta's main customers were business travelers. Kiwi could fly 200 or 400 seats a day and charge $100 or $180. Delta could keep its fares or fight with aggressive discounts.

  • With 400 seats, Kiwi would take enough passengers that Delta would fight. Kiwi's $100 fare is dominant, Delta's best response is to fight, and Kiwi earns $6,000 a day.
  • With 200 seats, Kiwi can't take many of Delta's passengers. Fighting would cut Delta's fares on its whole flight for the sake of 200 seats, so Delta keeps its fares, and Kiwi earns $7,000 a day.
Kiwi with 200 seats. Profits in thousands of dollars a day. Kiwi's $100 fare is dominant, and Delta keeps its fares.

Kiwi does better by entering small. Limited capacity is a commitment, like Alcoa's large capacity, but pointing the other way: it promises not to threaten the incumbent, so the incumbent's best response is to leave the entrant alone. This is the Week 8 assignment, which works through the full game.

4.4

Red Bull

Red Bull launched in Austria in 1987 and entered the United States in 1997, starting with a few states in the West and Southwest. The cola giants dominated soft drinks; energy drinks were a tiny niche. Red Bull didn't fight them on their ground. It sold a small, expensive can through bars, clubs and convenience stores chosen account by account, sponsored extreme sports instead of buying mass advertising, and cultivated an image the big brands couldn't copy without damaging their own. Coca-Cola's first energy drink, KMX, reached US stores only around the end of 2000.

Why didn't the incumbents respond sooner? The niche was too small to matter to them at first. A response risked cannibalizing their own brands and lending legitimacy to the category. And the product's edgy image didn't fit their family-friendly marketing. Each reason turns the incumbent's size against it, which is the core of the judo strategy. By the time the giants entered, Red Bull had defined the category and held most of it.

Summary

Entrants have strategic moves too. When customers must commit first, a firm may need to give up power to be trusted: Intel's second-source licenses made the low price its best response, and the OEMs adopted, raising Intel's profit from 2 to 5. A judo strategy avoids a fight the entrant would lose. Kiwi earns more with 200 seats than with 400, because a small entry makes accommodation Delta's best response. Red Bull entered a niche the cola giants didn't value, and by the time they answered, it had defined the category.

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