Managerial Economics

Week 08 · Complete notes

Market entry and barriers to entry

How can entrants overcome, and incumbents create, strategic barriers to entry?

This print edition combines all five readings. Interactive definitions become ordinary text when printed.

01

Getting in, keeping out

When does a threat to fight an entrant actually keep it out?

Monopoly and oligopoly profits attract attention. In Week 3, entry competed profit away in a competitive market. In concentrated markets, the incumbents have reasons and means to resist.

This reading separates barriers that come with an industry from those an incumbent chooses, writes entry as a game and shows why the most common threat, a price war, often fails to deter.

1.1

Profits attract entrants

In Week 3, positive profit in a competitive market drew in new firms until price fell to minimum average cost. In Week 4 we saw that a monopoly can earn profit for years, and in Week 7 that a few oligopolists can share it. Those profits are a standing invitation. An entrant asks a simple question: if I come in, what will I earn after the incumbents respond?

The answer depends on two kinds of obstacle.

  • come with the industry: large economies of scale, high capital requirements, scarce inputs, licenses and patents. Week 7 listed them as reasons why some markets have few firms.
  • are chosen by the incumbent to change the entrant's answer: price cuts, extra capacity, loyalty programs, exclusive contracts with suppliers or retailers, bundles that tie a new product to an established one, and large patent portfolios.

Structural barriers can be analyzed with the tools of Weeks 2 to 4. Strategic barriers need game theory, because what matters is how the entrant expects the incumbent to behave.

Structural or strategic?

Question 1 of 3

A new steel plant must produce at least 10% of national demand to reach the industry's lowest average cost.

Choose one answer.

1.2

The entry game

In the 1940s Alcoa produced nearly all the primary aluminum in the United States. Suppose Reynolds is considering entry. Reynolds moves first: it enters or stays out. If it enters, Alcoa responds: it fights, flooding the market and cutting the price, or it accommodates, sharing the market at a reasonable price. The tree labels accommodation "Share".

  • If Reynolds stays out, Alcoa keeps its monopoly profit of 10 and Reynolds earns 0.
  • If Reynolds enters and Alcoa accommodates, each earns 5.
  • If Reynolds enters and Alcoa fights, Alcoa earns 4 and Reynolds 1.
Each end node lists Alcoa's profit, then Reynolds's. Before clicking, decide what Alcoa does after entry.

Solve it backward. After entry, Alcoa earns 5 by accommodating and 4 by fighting, so it . Reynolds anticipates this: entering earns 5, staying out earns 0. Reynolds enters, and Alcoa accommodates.

Alcoa could announce that it will fight any entrant. If Reynolds believed it, Reynolds would compare 1 with 0 and still enter, so the threat wouldn't work even if believed. In other games a believed threat would deter, and then the question from Week 6 decides it: would Alcoa carry it out? Here it wouldn't. Once Reynolds is in, fighting costs Alcoa 1.

1.3

Why price wars rarely deter

The entry game captures a general point. A price war hurts both sides. Once the entrant has sunk its investment, the incumbent's question is no longer "how do I keep the entrant out?" but "what's my best response, given that it's in?" Usually that's to share the market at a decent price, not to fight.

An entrant who understands this ignores the threat. That's why incumbents who want to deter entry do something before entry that changes their own payoffs after it. Reading 2 shows how.

Summary. Structural barriers come with the industry; strategic barriers are chosen by the incumbent to change the entrant's payoff. In the basic entry game, Alcoa earns 5 by accommodating and 4 by fighting, so its threat to fight isn't credible, and Reynolds enters. Once an entrant is in, the incumbent picks its best response given entry, which is usually to share the market rather than wage a costly price war.

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