Week 08 ·

Market entry and barriers to entry

How can entrants overcome, and incumbents create, strategic barriers to entry?

Profits attract entrants, and incumbents would like to keep them out. We treat entry as a sequential game: an incumbent's threat to fight deters only if it would pay to carry out. Costly commitments such as excess capacity can make a threat credible; price wars and predatory pricing rarely are. Entrants have their own moves, from building trust to entering small on purpose. We finish with the hold-up problem, where a specific investment leaves one side exposed, and with one entry decision that uses the whole course.

Week 8 materials

01ReadFive sections of lecture notes.5 sections02ClassSlide deck.Not available yet03ExploreEntry games, excess capacity, the trust game and hold-up.4 interactive tools04PracticeJudo entry, capacity as a barrier, specific skills and a price-matching poster.5 activities05ReviewReview the week's material and concepts.10 checks

By the end

What you should be able to do

  1. Represent entry and accommodation or deterrence as a sequential game, and distinguish structural barriers from strategic actions.
  2. Test whether an entry-deterrence threat is credible, and explain how a costly commitment, such as excess capacity, can make it credible.
  3. Analyze claims of limit pricing and predatory pricing: what each needs to work and why they are hard to tell apart from ordinary competition.
  4. Explain how an entrant can use trust-building or a judo strategy, including staying small on purpose.
  5. Recognize a hold-up problem, explain why it leads to underinvestment and discuss contractual or organizational responses.
  6. Integrate market structure, pricing and game theory in one recommendation.

Concept atlas