Read 1 of 5
Getting in, keeping out
When does a threat to fight an entrant actually keep it out?
Monopoly and oligopoly profits attract attention. In Week 3, entry competed profit away in a competitive market. In concentrated markets, the incumbents have reasons and means to resist.
This reading separates barriers that come with an industry from those an incumbent chooses, writes entry as a game and shows why the most common threat, a price war, often fails to deter.
1.1
Profits attract entrants
In Week 3, positive profit in a competitive market drew in new firms until price fell to minimum average cost. In Week 4 we saw that a monopoly can earn profit for years, and in Week 7 that a few oligopolists can share it. Those profits are a standing invitation. An entrant asks a simple question: if I come in, what will I earn after the incumbents respond?
The answer depends on two kinds of obstacle.
- come with the industry: large economies of scale, high capital requirements, scarce inputs, licenses and patents. Week 7 listed them as reasons why some markets have few firms.
- are chosen by the incumbent to change the entrant's answer: price cuts, extra capacity, loyalty programs, exclusive contracts with suppliers or retailers, bundles that tie a new product to an established one, and large patent portfolios.
Structural barriers can be analyzed with the tools of Weeks 2 to 4. Strategic barriers need game theory, because what matters is how the entrant expects the incumbent to behave.
Structural or strategic?
A new steel plant must produce at least 10% of national demand to reach the industry's lowest average cost.
Economies of scale come with the technology. No incumbent chose them to keep anyone out.
An airline gives its frequent flyers status that they lose if they switch carriers.
The incumbent designed the program, and part of its value is that it makes customers costly for an entrant to win.
A beverage maker pays bars to stock only its drinks.
Exclusive dealing is chosen, and it can deny an entrant access to customers. Competition law looks closely at such contracts when the incumbent is dominant.
1.2
The entry game
In the 1940s Alcoa produced nearly all the primary aluminum in the United States. Suppose Reynolds is considering entry. Reynolds moves first: it enters or stays out. If it enters, Alcoa responds: it fights, flooding the market and cutting the price, or it accommodates, sharing the market at a reasonable price. The tree labels accommodation "Share".
- If Reynolds stays out, Alcoa keeps its monopoly profit of 10 and Reynolds earns 0.
- If Reynolds enters and Alcoa accommodates, each earns 5.
- If Reynolds enters and Alcoa fights, Alcoa earns 4 and Reynolds 1.
Solve it backward. After entry, Alcoa earns 5 by accommodating and 4 by fighting, so it . Reynolds anticipates this: entering earns 5, staying out earns 0. Reynolds enters, and Alcoa accommodates.
Alcoa could announce that it will fight any entrant. If Reynolds believed it, Reynolds would compare 1 with 0 and still enter, so the threat wouldn't work even if believed. In other games a believed threat would deter, and then the question from Week 6 decides it: would Alcoa carry it out? Here it wouldn't. Once Reynolds is in, fighting costs Alcoa 1.
1.3
Why price wars rarely deter
The entry game captures a general point. A price war hurts both sides. Once the entrant has sunk its investment, the incumbent's question is no longer "how do I keep the entrant out?" but "what's my best response, given that it's in?" Usually that's to share the market at a decent price, not to fight.
An entrant who understands this ignores the threat. That's why incumbents who want to deter entry do something before entry that changes their own payoffs after it. Reading 2 shows how.
Summary