Read 2 of 5

Commitment and capacity

How can an incumbent make a threat credible?

A threat is credible only if carrying it out pays when the time comes. An incumbent can make that true by acting first, in a way that changes its payoffs later.

This reading adds a capacity decision to the entry game, shows where such payoffs come from in a simple market and explains why a low price before entry isn't enough.

2.1

Alcoa builds capacity first

Now Alcoa chooses its capacity before Reynolds decides. Normal capacity leaves the game as it was. High capacity costs more to build and run, so it lowers Alcoa's payoff in every outcome: 7 instead of 10 if Reynolds stays out, 2 instead of 5 if Alcoa accommodates, 3 instead of 4 if it fights. But it also makes fighting cheaper relative to accommodating. With the extra capacity already paid for, flooding the market costs Alcoa little more, while sharing it leaves expensive plant idle. A fight now leaves Reynolds with −1.

Alcoa chooses high or normal capacity, Reynolds sees it and decides on entry, and Alcoa responds. Each end node lists Alcoa's profit, then Reynolds's.

Solve backward.

  • After high capacity and entry, Alcoa earns 3 by fighting and 2 by accommodating. It fights. Reynolds would earn −1 from entering, so it stays out, and Alcoa earns 7.
  • After normal capacity, the game is the one from Reading 1: Reynolds enters, Alcoa accommodates, and Alcoa earns 5.

Alcoa compares 7 with 5 and builds high capacity. In the credible Nash equilibrium, Reynolds stays out. The threat to fight is now credible, because after high capacity, fighting really is Alcoa's best response to entry.

2.2

What makes a commitment work

High capacity lowers every one of Alcoa's payoffs. Taken by itself, it's a bad investment. It pays only through its effect on Reynolds. That's the defining feature of a strategic : it makes you worse off in a way that changes what your rival expects you to do.

Three properties make it work.

  • Visible. Reynolds must see the capacity before it decides. Secret capacity deters no one.
  • Costly and hard to reverse. If Alcoa could sell the extra capacity cheaply after Reynolds stayed out, or before it fought, Reynolds would know that, and the commitment would unravel.
  • It changes the later choice. The point isn't to look strong. It's to make fighting Alcoa's best response if entry happens.

A commitment works by removing options. Alcoa's cheap way to accommodate is gone once the capacity is built. We saw the same logic in Week 6, when Akubra's promise to match prices kept Barmah from undercutting, and in the Advertisement Game, where an in-house department committed a firm to advertise more.

2.3

Where the payoffs come from

The Alcoa numbers are illustrative. Here is a market in which deters entry for reasons we can compute. Demand is \(p=900-q_1-q_2\), and production costs nothing up to a plant's capacity. A small plant costs 50,000 a year and can produce 100 units; a large one costs 175,000 and can produce 700.

Firm 1 is the incumbent. With no threat of entry, it compares a small plant, producing 100 units at a price of 800 for a profit of \(80{,}000-50{,}000=30{,}000\), with a large plant, producing the monopoly output of 450 at 450 for \(202{,}500-175{,}000=27{,}500\). Alone, it would build small.

Now Firm 2 can enter after seeing Firm 1's plant, and then the two compete on quantity, as in Week 7.

  • Firm 1 small, Firm 2 small: both produce at capacity, 100 each, at a price of 700. Each earns \(70{,}000-50{,}000=20{,}000\).
  • Firm 1 large, Firm 2 small: Firm 2 produces its 100, and Firm 1's best response is \(450-\frac{100}{2}=400\). The price is 400. Firm 2 earns \(40{,}000-50{,}000=-10{,}000\).
  • Firm 1 large, Firm 2 large: the Cournot outputs, 300 each at a price of 300. Each earns \(90{,}000-175{,}000=-85{,}000\).

If Firm 1 builds small, Firm 2 enters with a small plant and both earn 20,000. If Firm 1 builds large, any entry loses money, so Firm 2 stays out and Firm 1 earns 27,500. Firm 1 builds large. The large plant is worth building only because of the entrant it keeps out. The practice set works through this game in full.

2.4

Limit pricing

Could the incumbent deter entry just by keeping its price low? This is : charging less than the monopoly price, but above cost, before entry, to make the market look unattractive.

The trouble is the same as in Reading 1. The entrant cares about the price after it enters, and after entry the incumbent will choose its best price given entry, whatever it charged before. A low price today is not, by itself, a commitment to anything tomorrow.

Limit pricing can still work when the price carries information. If the entrant doesn't know the incumbent's costs, a low price may signal that the incumbent's costs are low and that competing with it would be unprofitable. It can also work when today's price shapes tomorrow's market, for example by locking in customers on long contracts. Without information or lock-in, a low price before entry gives up profit and deters no one.

Summary

A commitment is a visible, costly, hard-to-reverse action that changes what you'll want to do later. Alcoa's high capacity lowers all its payoffs but makes fighting its best response to entry, so Reynolds stays out and Alcoa earns 7 instead of 5. In a capacity model with demand \(p=900-q_1-q_2\), the incumbent builds a large plant that it wouldn't build as an unthreatened monopolist, because the large plant makes any entry unprofitable. A low price before entry deters only if it carries information or locks in customers.

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