Read 5 of 5

Hold-up, and putting it together

Why do firms underinvest when an investment ties them to one partner, and how can one decision use the whole course?

Entry often requires investments that are worth much more with one partner than without it: a parts plant next to one carmaker, a spur line to one mine. Once the investment is sunk, the partner can renegotiate.

This reading shows how that threat distorts investment, what firms do about it, and then works through one entry decision with the tools of all eight weeks.

5.1

Specific investments

A is worth more inside a particular relationship than outside it. Examples:

  • A coal mine that depends on one railway to reach the port.
  • A distributor that spends heavily on marketing one manufacturer's product.
  • A supplier that does early design work for one buyer's new model.
  • A firm that builds a pipeline whose returns can later be changed by regulation.

In each case, once the investment is made, the investor depends on the other side. If the terms of the deal can be reopened after the investment, the other side can take a large part of the return. Anticipating that, the investor invests less, or not at all. This is the .

5.2

NiceBody and CoolCar

NiceBody makes car bodies and is negotiating with CoolCar, which is planning a new model. NiceBody must invest in tooling. An investment of size \(x\) costs NiceBody \(x^2\) million dollars. The tooling is worth \(3x\) million to CoolCar, but only \(2x\) million to other buyers, because it's partly built around CoolCar's design.

Suppose the price is set after NiceBody invests, and CoolCar names it. CoolCar offers just enough to beat NiceBody's other buyers: \(2x\). NiceBody keeps \(2x-x^2\) and chooses \(x\) to maximize it:

\(\dfrac{d}{dx}\left(2x-x^2\right)\)\(=\)\(2-2x\)\(2-2x\)\(=\)\(0\)NiceBody's best investment.\(x\)\(=\)\(1\)

NiceBody invests 1 and keeps \(2-1=1\). CoolCar keeps \(3-2=1\). Total surplus is 2.

The efficient investment maximizes total surplus, \(3x-x^2\):

\(3-2x\)\(=\)\(0\)Marginal value equals marginal cost.\(x\)\(=\)\(1.5\)

At \(x=1.5\), total surplus is \(4.5-2.25=2.25\). Hold-up costs 0.25 of surplus. NiceBody bears the whole cost of each extra unit of investment but receives only the part of the return it could get elsewhere, \(2\) per unit instead of \(3\). The specific part, 1 per unit, goes to CoolCar, so NiceBody stops early.

Drag the investment. The red curve is what NiceBody keeps when CoolCar sets the price after the investment. Show total surplus to see the efficient level.

5.3

What firms do about it

The problem comes from bargaining after the investment is sunk. Every remedy changes that.

  • Agree the price before investing. A long-term contract that pays NiceBody \(3x\), or a fixed price for a specified tooling, lets NiceBody keep the return on its investment. The limit is that contracts are : if quality can't be verified in court, or circumstances change in ways nobody foresaw, the contract gets renegotiated, and hold-up returns.
  • Change who has the bargaining power. If NiceBody names the price after investing, it asks for \(3x\), keeps \(3x-x^2\) and invests the efficient 1.5. Bargaining power should sit with the party making the specific investment.
  • Integrate. If CoolCar owns NiceBody, there's no price to renegotiate, and the joint owner invests efficiently. has costs, such as weaker incentives inside a large firm, but it's a common answer when specific investments are large.
  • Keep alternatives open. Making the investment less specific, or using several suppliers, raises the investor's outside option. Intel's second sources did this for the OEMs.
  • Rely on reputation. A buyer that deals with many suppliers over many years loses future business if it holds one up. That's the repeated-game logic of Week 6 again.

OMBA's EnerTech scenario is a good case to discuss. A solar developer signed a 20-year contract with a grid operator, invested billions in a remote site and then faced a demand to renegotiate when market prices fell. Ask which of these remedies could have protected it, and at what cost.

5.4

Putting it together: one entry decision

Suppose you're advising a mid-sized Australian company considering entry into a regional market served by one large incumbent. Here's how the course's tools line up.

  1. Value and cost (Weeks 1 and 2). What will customers pay, and what does entry cost? Count opportunity costs, and separate the sunk cost of entering from the avoidable costs of operating.
  2. The market (Weeks 3 and 4). Is the incumbent's profit a scarcity rent that entry will compete away, or a monopoly protected by structural barriers? What does demand elasticity say about how much the incumbent marks up?
  3. Pricing (Week 5). Can the entrant serve a segment the incumbent prices out, with a different version or a different price?
  4. Strategy (Week 6). Write the game. After entry, what is the incumbent's best response? Is any threat it makes credible?
  5. Competition after entry (Week 7). Will the firms compete on price or on capacity? Are the products identical or differentiated? Will they learn to coexist, or tacitly collude, if they meet every day?
  6. Commitments (Week 8). Has the incumbent committed to fight, for example with excess capacity? Can the entrant commit not to threaten it, by entering small or in a niche? Does entry require specific investments that a partner could hold up?

A recommendation that answers these questions in order is a managerial economist's recommendation: it says what the entrant should do, and why the other side will respond the way you expect.

Summary

A relationship-specific investment is worth more inside one relationship than outside it, so once it's sunk the partner can renegotiate and take the specific part of the return. Anticipating hold-up, the investor underinvests: NiceBody invests 1 instead of the efficient 1.5 when CoolCar sets the price afterward. Remedies change the bargaining after investment: price agreed in advance, bargaining power with the investor, vertical integration, outside options or reputation. Contracts are incomplete, so none is free. The course's tools combine in one entry decision: value and cost, market structure, pricing, the game, competition after entry, and commitments.

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