Read 2 of 5

Competing on quantity

How much should a firm produce when its rival's output moves the price it gets?

In some industries the main decision is how much to produce. Aluminum smelters, oil producers and steel mills decide output and capacity, and the market price is whatever clears the market for everything they bring.

This reading solves that game for two aluminum producers, first with three possible outputs and then with any output. The result sits between the monopoly and the competitive outcome, and it moves toward competition as firms are added.

2.1

AluStrong and MetaLite

AluStrong and MetaLite are the two producers of a high-grade aluminum used in cars and construction. Their products are identical, and their technology is well known: each has a cost of \(C(q)=20q\), where \(q\) is output in tonnes. Market demand is also well known. The inverse demand is

Inverse demand\(p=140-Q,\quad Q=q_a+q_m\)

where \(q_a\) and \(q_m\) are the two firms' outputs. Each firm chooses its output without seeing the other's, and the price then adjusts so that buyers take everything produced. This is , often called Cournot competition after the economist who first analyzed it in 1838.

Start with three possible outputs: 30, 40 or 45 tonnes. Take one cell. If AluStrong produces 40 and MetaLite 30, the total is 70 tonnes and the price is \(140-70=70\). AluStrong's profit is \((70-20)\times40=2{,}000\) and MetaLite's is \((70-20)\times30=1{,}500\). Doing this for every cell gives the payoff matrix.

Profits. AluStrong chooses a row and MetaLite a column, in tonnes.

Before you solve it

Question 1 of 1

MetaLite produces 30. What is AluStrong's best response?

Choose one answer.

Underline each firm's best responses. Against 30, the best response is 45; against 40 it's 40; against 45 it's 40. Only one cell has both payoffs shaded.

Best responses shaded. The Nash equilibrium is (40, 40).

The Nash equilibrium is 40 tonnes each, at a price of 60, with a profit of 1,600 each. Notice the cell (30, 30): each firm would earn 1,800 there, more than in equilibrium. We'll come back to it in Reading 5.

2.2

Marginal revenue that depends on the rival

Firms aren't limited to three outputs. To handle any output, use the rule from Week 4: a firm with market power produces where marginal revenue equals marginal cost. The difference is that AluStrong's marginal revenue now depends on MetaLite's output.

AluStrong's revenue is its output times the price, and the price depends on both outputs:

\(R_a\)\(=\)\((140-q_a-q_m)\,q_a\)\(=\)\(140q_a-q_a^2-q_mq_a\)

So AluStrong's marginal revenue is \(MR_a=140-2q_a-q_m\). Every tonne MetaLite produces lowers the price AluStrong gets on all its tonnes, and so lowers AluStrong's marginal revenue. Another way to see it: given MetaLite's output, AluStrong is a monopoly on the demand that's left over, \(p=(140-q_m)-q_a\). This residual demand has the same slope as market demand, but MetaLite's output shifts it in.

Set marginal revenue equal to marginal cost:

\(140-2q_a-q_m\)\(=\)\(20\)\(MR_a=MC\)\(2q_a\)\(=\)\(120-q_m\)\(q_a\)\(=\)\(\dfrac{120-q_m}{2}\)

This is AluStrong's . For every output MetaLite might choose, it gives AluStrong's profit-maximizing output. If MetaLite produces nothing, AluStrong produces 60, the monopoly output. If MetaLite produces 40, AluStrong produces 40. If MetaLite produces 120, AluStrong produces nothing. The more the rival produces, the less AluStrong wants to produce. MetaLite faces the same problem, so its best response is \(q_m=\frac{120-q_a}{2}\).

2.3

The Cournot equilibrium

A Nash equilibrium is a pair of outputs in which each is a best response to the other: a point on both best-response functions at once. On a graph with AluStrong's output across and MetaLite's up, that's where the two lines cross.

Drag the point up and down to change MetaLite's output. The red line gives AluStrong's best reply. Then show MetaLite's best response and find the point that lies on both lines.

Any other point fails. Pick MetaLite's output at 100: AluStrong's best reply is 10, but MetaLite's best reply to 10 is 55, not 100. Somebody would change their output, so it isn't an equilibrium.

To find the crossing, use the symmetry: the firms are identical, so in equilibrium they produce the same amount, \(q_a=q_m=q\). Substitute into either best response:

\(q\)\(=\)\(\dfrac{120-q}{2}\)Both firms produce \(q\).\(3q\)\(=\)\(120\)\(q\)\(=\)\(40\)

Each firm produces 40 tonnes, the total is 80 and the price is \(140-80=60\). Each firm earns \((60-20)\times40=1{,}600\). It's the same answer as the 3 × 3 matrix, because 40 happened to be on the list.

2.4

Between monopoly and competition

Compare the Cournot outcome with the two benchmarks from earlier weeks, using the same demand and cost.

MarketTotal outputPriceIndustry profit
Monopoly60803,600
Cournot duopoly80603,200
Perfect competition120200

The monopoly row comes from \(MR=140-2Q=20\), so \(Q=60\). The competitive row comes from \(p=MC=20\), so \(Q=120\).

Why do the two firms produce more than a monopoly would? When AluStrong adds a tonne, the price falls on all the aluminum sold. AluStrong counts the loss on its own 40 tonnes, but not the loss on MetaLite's 40. A monopoly owning both plants would count both, and it would produce less. Each Cournot firm ignores the harm its output does to the rival, so together they overproduce compared with the monopoly. That's good for buyers. It is also the reason the firms would like to agree to cut back, as Reading 5 shows.

2.5

More firms

What happens with \(n\) identical firms? Each firm's marginal revenue is \(140-2q_i-Q_{-i}\), where \(Q_{-i}\) is the output of all the others. In a symmetric equilibrium every firm produces the same \(q\), so \(Q_{-i}=(n-1)q\):

\(140-2q-(n-1)q\)\(=\)\(20\)\(MR=MC\) for each firm\((n+1)q\)\(=\)\(120\)\(q\)\(=\)\(\dfrac{120}{n+1}\)

Total output is \(nq=\frac{120n}{n+1}\) and the price is \(p=20+\frac{120}{n+1}\).

FirmsEach firm's outputTotal outputPriceHHI
160608010,000
24080605,000
33090503,333
520100402,000
111011030909
Move the slider to add firms. The green point is the Cournot outcome; it starts at the monopoly point and slides down demand toward the competitive point.

One firm gives the monopoly. As firms are added, the markup over cost, \(\frac{120}{n+1}\), shrinks toward zero and the outcome approaches perfect competition. This is one reason competition agencies care about the number and size of firms: in a quantity-setting industry, fewer firms means a higher price. Cournot connects the concentration measures of Reading 1 to prices.

Summary

In quantity competition each firm sets \(MR=MC\), but its marginal revenue falls as the rival produces more. For AluStrong, \(MR_a=140-2q_a-q_m\), so the best response is \(q_a=\frac{120-q_m}{2}\). The Cournot equilibrium is where the best responses cross: 40 tonnes each at a price of 60. That lies between monopoly (60 tonnes at 80) and competition (120 at 20), because each firm ignores the price cut its output imposes on the rival. With \(n\) firms the price is \(20+\frac{120}{n+1}\), which falls toward cost as \(n\) grows.

Concept atlas