Week 07 ·
Oligopolistic markets
How does strategic interdependence change price, output, differentiation and capacity decisions?
Many important markets have a few large firms: too few for any of them to take the price as given, too many for any of them to act as a monopoly. Each firm's best choice depends on its rivals' choices. We measure how concentrated a market is, solve for equilibrium when firms compete on quantity and when they compete on price, see how differentiation and capacity soften price competition, and ask when firms can hold a cartel together.
Week 7 materials
By the end
What you should be able to do
- Explain why an oligopoly can't be analyzed as a monopoly or as perfect competition, and measure concentration with the concentration ratio and the HHI.
- Derive a firm's best-response function in a quantity game and solve for the Cournot equilibrium.
- Explain the Bertrand result with identical products, and why the price ends at marginal cost with only two firms.
- Analyze how product differentiation or a capacity limit softens price competition.
- Compare the Cournot and Bertrand models: their assumptions, their predictions and the industries each one fits.
- Explain the tension between collusion and individual deviation, and use the discount factor to find when a cartel holds together.