Week 07 ·

Oligopolistic markets

How does strategic interdependence change price, output, differentiation and capacity decisions?

Many important markets have a few large firms: too few for any of them to take the price as given, too many for any of them to act as a monopoly. Each firm's best choice depends on its rivals' choices. We measure how concentrated a market is, solve for equilibrium when firms compete on quantity and when they compete on price, see how differentiation and capacity soften price competition, and ask when firms can hold a cartel together.

Week 7 materials

01ReadFive sections of lecture notes.5 sections02ClassSlide deck.Not available yet03ExploreCournot best responses, more firms, differentiated prices and cartel stability.5 interactive tools04PracticeQuantity and price competition, capacity, complements and cartels.6 activities05ReviewReview the week's material and concepts.10 checks

By the end

What you should be able to do

  1. Explain why an oligopoly can't be analyzed as a monopoly or as perfect competition, and measure concentration with the concentration ratio and the HHI.
  2. Derive a firm's best-response function in a quantity game and solve for the Cournot equilibrium.
  3. Explain the Bertrand result with identical products, and why the price ends at marginal cost with only two firms.
  4. Analyze how product differentiation or a capacity limit softens price competition.
  5. Compare the Cournot and Bertrand models: their assumptions, their predictions and the industries each one fits.
  6. Explain the tension between collusion and individual deviation, and use the discount factor to find when a cartel holds together.

Concept atlas