Read 5 of 5

Cartels and collusion

Why do firms want to collude, why do cartels break down, and when do they hold?

In every game this week, the firms would earn more if they could agree to compete less. AluStrong and MetaLite would earn 1,800 each by producing 30 tonnes instead of 1,600 at 40. The cafés with regulars would earn 360 a day at $8 instead of 320 at $6.

This reading looks at why such agreements are hard to keep, uses the repeated games of Week 6 to find when they hold, and asks what makes a market more prone to collusion. Then it turns to the law.

5.1

What a cartel wants

A is a group of firms that agree to restrict output or keep prices up, aiming for the profit a monopoly would earn and sharing it among themselves. OPEC is the best-known example: its members agree on production quotas to support the price of oil.

For AluStrong and MetaLite, a monopoly would produce 60 tonnes in total and earn 3,600. Split evenly, that's a quota of 30 tonnes each and a profit of 1,800 each, compared with 1,600 each in the Cournot equilibrium. The cartel gains by doing what Reading 2 said the Cournot firms fail to do: taking into account that each tonne one firm produces lowers the price the other gets.

5.2

The temptation to cheat

The trouble is that the quota isn't a best response to itself. If MetaLite produces its 30 tonnes, AluStrong's best response is \(\frac{120-30}{2}=45\). By producing 45, AluStrong earns 2,025 instead of 1,800. MetaLite faces the same temptation.

Look only at the quota of 30 and the Cournot output of 40:

Profits. Producing 40 is a dominant strategy for both firms.

This is a prisoner's dilemma. Producing 40 is a dominant strategy for each firm, and both end at 1,600 when both could have 1,800. The cartel agreement doesn't change the payoffs, so on its own it doesn't change the outcome. In a one-shot game the cartel breaks down. The same is true for the cafés at $8, and for every cartel: the price or quota that maximizes joint profit is one at which each member gains by cheating.

5.3

When the cartel holds

Cartels don't meet once. AluStrong and MetaLite choose their output every month, and Week 6 showed that repetition can sustain cooperation. Suppose each firm follows grim trigger: produce the quota of 30 as long as both firms always have; after any month in which someone produced more, produce 40 forever.

If AluStrong keeps to the quota, it earns 1,800 every month, worth \(\frac{1800}{1-\delta}\) today.

If AluStrong cheats by producing 40 this month, it earns 2,000 now. From next month, both produce 40, and AluStrong earns 1,600 a month after that.

\(\dfrac{1800}{1-\delta}\)\(\geq\)\(2000+\dfrac{1600\delta}{1-\delta}\)Keep the quota against cheat.\(1800\)\(\geq\)\(2000(1-\delta)+1600\delta\)Multiply both sides by \(1-\delta\).\(1800\)\(\geq\)\(2000-400\delta\)\(\delta\)\(\geq\)\(\dfrac{1}{2}\)

The cartel holds if \(\delta\geq\frac{1}{2}\). This is the Week 6 formula \(\delta\geq\frac{T-R}{T-P}\) with \(T=2000\), \(R=1800\) and \(P=1600\). The punishment is credible, because producing 40 each is a Nash equilibrium of the one-month game: once the cartel has collapsed, neither firm can do better than 40.

Drag the discount factor and watch the comparison between keeping the quota and cheating once. Then change the profits: what makes the cartel easier to hold?

A cheater could do even better than 40. Its best response to the rival's 30 is 45, worth 2,025. With that larger gain from cheating, the condition becomes \(\frac{1800}{1-\delta}\geq2025+\frac{1600\delta}{1-\delta}\), which gives \(\delta\geq\frac{225}{425}=\frac{9}{17}\approx0.53\). A bigger temptation needs more patience.

Price cartels work the same way. Two sellers of an identical product who agree on the monopoly price each earn half the monopoly profit. A cheater who undercuts by a cent takes the whole monopoly profit for one period, and then Bertrand competition leaves both with nothing. Cooperation needs \(\frac{1}{2}\cdot\frac{1}{1-\delta}\geq1\), so \(\delta\geq\frac{1}{2}\). With \(n\) firms each earns a share of \(\frac{1}{n}\), and the condition becomes \(\delta\geq1-\frac{1}{n}\): \(\frac{4}{5}\) for five firms and \(\frac{9}{10}\) for ten. The practice set works through this case.

5.4

What makes cartels fragile

The condition \(\delta\geq\frac{T-R}{T-P}\) explains most of what is known about when cartels survive.

  • More members. Each member's share of the cartel profit shrinks, while the gain from cheating, taking the whole market for a while, doesn't. That's why the condition for \(n\) price-setters, \(\delta\geq1-\frac{1}{n}\), rises with \(n\).
  • Hidden cheating. If a secret discount to a large customer goes unnoticed for months, the punishment arrives late. A late punishment is worth less today, which works like a lower \(\delta\). Cartels therefore try to make prices and outputs visible, through published price lists, shared sales data or a trade association.
  • Infrequent or irregular sales. When a large contract comes up once a year, the gain from undercutting on it is large and the next chance to punish is far away.
  • Shifting demand and costs. When conditions change, members disagree about the right price or quota, and it becomes hard to tell cheating from bad luck.
  • Differences among members. A low-cost firm or one with spare capacity gains more from cheating and loses less from a price war. A member that badly needs cash now, which is a low \(\delta\), is tempted too. OPEC members facing a budget crisis have often produced above their quotas.
  • Entry. High cartel prices attract new firms, which aren't party to the agreement. That's where Week 8 begins.

Firms can also hold prices up without any agreement. If every firm expects that a price cut will be matched at once, cutting doesn't pay, and prices stay high. This is . The Hats assignment from Week 6 showed one way it happens: a promise to match a rival's price, which sounds competitive, can remove the gain from undercutting.

5.5

Cartels and the law

In Australia, cartel conduct is prohibited by the Competition and Consumer Act 2010. Agreeing with a competitor to fix prices, restrict output, share markets or rig bids is both a civil contravention and a criminal offense, and individuals involved can be jailed. The ACCC investigates and brings civil cases; serious criminal cases go to the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions.

Two cases show how cartels work and how they're caught.

  • BlueScope Steel. In 2023 the Federal Court ordered BlueScope to pay $57.5 million, a record penalty for cartel conduct in Australia, in a case the ACCC brought in 2019. Between 2013 and 2014, BlueScope and a former general manager tried to get Australian steel distributors and an overseas manufacturer to agree on higher prices for flat steel. The agreements didn't have to succeed: trying to induce them was enough. The penalty was upheld on appeal in 2025.
  • The European car-battery recyclers. In 2017 the European Commission fined three recyclers, Eco-Bat, Recylex and Campine, about €68 million. From 2009 to 2012 they had agreed to lower the prices they paid for scrap car batteries, a cartel of buyers rather than sellers. A fourth member, Johnson Controls, paid nothing, because it was the first to report the cartel.

The second case shows a powerful tool against cartels: leniency. The first member to confess and cooperate escapes the penalty, and later ones get smaller discounts. Leniency adds a new temptation to cheat, this time on the cartel itself, and it makes each member worry that another will confess first. It turns the cartel's repeated game back into a prisoner's dilemma.

Tacit collusion is harder for the law to reach. Firms that simply watch each other and match price changes haven't made an agreement. Competition law responds mainly through merger review: it's easier to stop a market from becoming concentrated enough for tacit collusion than to prove collusion afterward.

5.6

Looking ahead to Week 8

This week the number of firms was fixed. In Week 8 it isn't: an incumbent earning oligopoly or monopoly profits has to worry about firms that might enter. The tools from Weeks 6 and 7 come together there. Capacity becomes a way to commit, a threat of a price war against an entrant has to be credible, and a small entrant can sometimes do best by staying small.

Summary

Firms in an oligopoly earn more if they restrict output or raise prices together, but the joint optimum is never a best response to itself: AluStrong's best reply to the quota of 30 is 45. A one-shot cartel is a prisoner's dilemma. In a repeated game, grim trigger sustains the quota when \(\delta\geq\frac{T-R}{T-P}\): \(\frac{1}{2}\) if cheating means producing 40, and \(\frac{9}{17}\) if the cheater produces 45. Cartels are harder to hold with more members, hidden cheating, infrequent sales, shifting demand, different members and entry. Cartels are illegal, and leniency for the first to confess makes them harder to hold. Tacit collusion can do similar harm without an agreement.

Concept atlas