Read 4 of 5
Differentiated products
How does differentiation soften price competition, and when should we expect Cournot or Bertrand?
Few products are truly identical. Customers have favorite brands, favorite cafés and favorite phones, and many won't switch for a small price difference. Firms spend heavily to make that so.
This reading gives the cafés some regulars, finds the new equilibrium and compares how the two models of competition fit different industries.
4.1
Loyal customers and price-sensitive ones
In the smartphone market, some customers want an iPhone for its design, its integration with other Apple products and its ecosystem. Others prefer Samsung's Galaxy phones for their flexibility and customization. Both groups would switch for a large enough price difference, but not for a small one. A third group sees the two phones as close substitutes and buys whichever is cheaper.
changes the arithmetic of a price cut. A firm that cuts its price wins some of the price-sensitive customers, but few of the rival's loyal ones, and it gives a discount to all of its own customers, including those who'd have paid more. A price rise loses some price-sensitive customers but keeps most of the loyal ones. The best price balances the two, and it settles above marginal cost.
4.2
The cafés with regulars
Give the two cafés some regulars. Café A's daily sales are now
and Café B's are the mirror image. If Café A raises its price by $1, it sells 20 fewer cups a day. If Café B raises its price by $1, Café A sells 10 more. Coffee at the two cafés is now a pair of substitutes in the sense of Week 2, but not perfect ones. The marginal cost is still $2 a cup.
Café A's profit is \((p_A-2)(140-20p_A+10p_B)\). For a given \(p_B\), raising \(p_A\) by a dollar adds a dollar of margin on every cup sold but loses 20 cups at the current margin. The best price makes these two effects equal:
This is Café A's best-response function. If Café B charges $2, Café A's best reply is $5. If Café B charges $6, it's $6. If Café B charges $10, it's $7. In equilibrium both cafés charge the same price, so \(p=\frac{18+p}{4}\), which gives \(4p=18+p\) and \(p=6\).
Both cafés charge $6, sell \(140-120+60=80\) cups a day and earn \((6-2)\times80=320\) a day. Differentiation has lifted the price from $2 to $6.
4.3
Best responses that slope up
Compare the two graphs this week. In the aluminum game, AluStrong's best response slopes down: the more MetaLite produces, the less AluStrong wants to produce. In the café game, Café A's best response slopes up: the lower Café B's price, the lower Café A's best price.
So the two models predict different reactions to an aggressive rival. If a rival expands output, a quantity-setter cuts back and makes room. If a rival cuts its price, a price-setter cuts too, though by less: a quarter as much for the cafés. Economists call quantities in Cournot competition strategic substitutes and differentiated prices strategic complements. The names matter less than the direction of the reaction, which a manager needs to anticipate.
4.4
The price ladder
What if the two cafés set one price together, as if a single owner ran both? With a common price \(p\), each café sells \(140-20p+10p=140-10p\) cups. Joint profit per café is \((p-2)(140-10p)\):
Each café sells 60 cups at $8 and earns \(6\times60=360\) a day.
| Situation | Price | Cups per café | Daily profit per café |
|---|---|---|---|
| Identical coffee | $2 | Half the market | 0 |
| Regulars, prices set separately | $6 | 80 | 320 |
| Regulars, one price set together | $8 | 60 | 360 |
The Week 6 cafés couldn't hold $6, because their coffee was identical and undercutting took every customer. With regulars, $6 is the equilibrium. And $8 would be better still, if only each café didn't want to undercut it: Café A's best reply to $8 is \(\frac{18+8}{4}=6.50\). That's the problem a cartel has to solve, and it's the subject of Reading 5.
4.5
Cournot or Bertrand?
Which model should a manager use? Neither is right or wrong in general. Each fits industries where its assumption about the hard-to-change decision is realistic.
| Quantity competition (Cournot) | Price competition (Bertrand) | |
|---|---|---|
| Firms choose | Output or capacity; the market sets the price | Prices; they serve whoever buys |
| Fits when | Capacity is costly and slow to change, so it's chosen first | Capacity is flexible and prices are easy to change |
| Two firms, identical products | Price between monopoly and cost | Price equal to cost |
| Rival turns aggressive | Cut back your output | Cut your price too, by less |
| Examples | Aluminum, oil, steel, memory chips, grain | Software, online retail, insurance quotes, consulting bids |
Many industries combine the two. Airlines choose fleets and schedules months ahead and then set fares every day. As the capacity section of Reading 3 showed, when capacity is chosen first and prices second, the outcome looks like Cournot. Prices then fall hard only when there's spare capacity, which is when airline price wars tend to break out.
Which model fits?
For each market, choose the model that best describes how the firms compete.
A few oil producers decide how many barrels to pump each month. The price is set on world markets.
Producers choose output, and the market price clears. That's Cournot. It's also why OPEC sets production quotas, not prices.
Two firms sell almost identical tax-preparation software online. Serving one more customer costs almost nothing.
Capacity is unlimited and the products are close substitutes, so price is the decision and undercutting wins customers. Expect fierce price competition, and expect the firms to differentiate, for example with free basic versions and paid extras.
Two cement plants serve a region. Each plant takes years to build and runs close to full capacity.
Capacity is chosen first and is costly to change. Even if the plants quote prices, the capacity limit removes most of the gain from undercutting, and the outcome looks like Cournot.
Summary