Read 4 of 5

Differentiated products

How does differentiation soften price competition, and when should we expect Cournot or Bertrand?

Few products are truly identical. Customers have favorite brands, favorite cafés and favorite phones, and many won't switch for a small price difference. Firms spend heavily to make that so.

This reading gives the cafés some regulars, finds the new equilibrium and compares how the two models of competition fit different industries.

4.1

Loyal customers and price-sensitive ones

In the smartphone market, some customers want an iPhone for its design, its integration with other Apple products and its ecosystem. Others prefer Samsung's Galaxy phones for their flexibility and customization. Both groups would switch for a large enough price difference, but not for a small one. A third group sees the two phones as close substitutes and buys whichever is cheaper.

changes the arithmetic of a price cut. A firm that cuts its price wins some of the price-sensitive customers, but few of the rival's loyal ones, and it gives a discount to all of its own customers, including those who'd have paid more. A price rise loses some price-sensitive customers but keeps most of the loyal ones. The best price balances the two, and it settles above marginal cost.

4.2

The cafés with regulars

Give the two cafés some regulars. Café A's daily sales are now

Café A's demand\(q_A=140-20p_A+10p_B\)

and Café B's are the mirror image. If Café A raises its price by $1, it sells 20 fewer cups a day. If Café B raises its price by $1, Café A sells 10 more. Coffee at the two cafés is now a pair of substitutes in the sense of Week 2, but not perfect ones. The marginal cost is still $2 a cup.

Café A's profit is \((p_A-2)(140-20p_A+10p_B)\). For a given \(p_B\), raising \(p_A\) by a dollar adds a dollar of margin on every cup sold but loses 20 cups at the current margin. The best price makes these two effects equal:

\(140-20p_A+10p_B\)\(=\)\(20(p_A-2)\)Gain on cups sold = loss on cups lost\(180+10p_B\)\(=\)\(40p_A\)\(p_A\)\(=\)\(\dfrac{18+p_B}{4}\)

This is Café A's best-response function. If Café B charges $2, Café A's best reply is $5. If Café B charges $6, it's $6. If Café B charges $10, it's $7. In equilibrium both cafés charge the same price, so \(p=\frac{18+p}{4}\), which gives \(4p=18+p\) and \(p=6\).

Both cafés charge $6, sell \(140-120+60=80\) cups a day and earn \((6-2)\times80=320\) a day. Differentiation has lifted the price from $2 to $6.

Drag the point to change Café B's price and read Café A's best reply. Then show Café B's best response, and the identical-coffee and joint prices.

4.3

Best responses that slope up

Compare the two graphs this week. In the aluminum game, AluStrong's best response slopes down: the more MetaLite produces, the less AluStrong wants to produce. In the café game, Café A's best response slopes up: the lower Café B's price, the lower Café A's best price.

So the two models predict different reactions to an aggressive rival. If a rival expands output, a quantity-setter cuts back and makes room. If a rival cuts its price, a price-setter cuts too, though by less: a quarter as much for the cafés. Economists call quantities in Cournot competition strategic substitutes and differentiated prices strategic complements. The names matter less than the direction of the reaction, which a manager needs to anticipate.

4.4

The price ladder

What if the two cafés set one price together, as if a single owner ran both? With a common price \(p\), each café sells \(140-20p+10p=140-10p\) cups. Joint profit per café is \((p-2)(140-10p)\):

\(140-10p\)\(=\)\(10(p-2)\)Gain on cups sold = loss on cups lost\(160\)\(=\)\(20p\)\(p\)\(=\)\(8\)

Each café sells 60 cups at $8 and earns \(6\times60=360\) a day.

SituationPriceCups per caféDaily profit per café
Identical coffee$2Half the market0
Regulars, prices set separately$680320
Regulars, one price set together$860360

The Week 6 cafés couldn't hold $6, because their coffee was identical and undercutting took every customer. With regulars, $6 is the equilibrium. And $8 would be better still, if only each café didn't want to undercut it: Café A's best reply to $8 is \(\frac{18+8}{4}=6.50\). That's the problem a cartel has to solve, and it's the subject of Reading 5.

4.5

Cournot or Bertrand?

Which model should a manager use? Neither is right or wrong in general. Each fits industries where its assumption about the hard-to-change decision is realistic.

Quantity competition (Cournot)Price competition (Bertrand)
Firms chooseOutput or capacity; the market sets the pricePrices; they serve whoever buys
Fits whenCapacity is costly and slow to change, so it's chosen firstCapacity is flexible and prices are easy to change
Two firms, identical productsPrice between monopoly and costPrice equal to cost
Rival turns aggressiveCut back your outputCut your price too, by less
ExamplesAluminum, oil, steel, memory chips, grainSoftware, online retail, insurance quotes, consulting bids

Many industries combine the two. Airlines choose fleets and schedules months ahead and then set fares every day. As the capacity section of Reading 3 showed, when capacity is chosen first and prices second, the outcome looks like Cournot. Prices then fall hard only when there's spare capacity, which is when airline price wars tend to break out.

Which model fits?

For each market, choose the model that best describes how the firms compete.

Question 1 of 3

A few oil producers decide how many barrels to pump each month. The price is set on world markets.

Choose one answer.

Summary

Differentiation means a price cut wins only some of a rival's customers and gives a discount to your own, so prices stay above cost. For the cafés with regulars, the best response is \(p_A=\frac{18+p_B}{4}\), and the equilibrium is $6, against $2 with identical coffee and $8 if they set one price together. Best responses slope down for quantities and up for differentiated prices. Use Cournot when capacity is chosen first and hard to change, and Bertrand when capacity is flexible and price is the main decision.

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