Read 3 of 5

Competing on price

What happens when firms selling the same product compete on price?

In Week 6 the two cafés could charge only $4 or $6, and both ended up at $4. Now let them charge any price. The result is stark: two firms are enough to drive the price all the way down to cost.

This reading derives that result, lists what it assumes and shows how a capacity limit undoes it.

3.1

The cafés, at any price

Return to the two cafés across the street. Their coffee is identical, each cup costs $2 to make, and customers buy from whichever café is cheaper. If the prices are equal, the customers split evenly. Each café can now charge any price it likes. This is , often called Bertrand competition after the economist who raised it in 1883.

Suppose both cafés charge the same price \(p\) above $2. Each serves half the customers and earns \(p-2\) on each cup. Now Café A cuts its price by one cent. Its margin falls by one cent, but it takes every customer, so it nearly doubles its sales. Undercutting pays. Café B reasons the same way. Any common price above $2 invites an undercut.

What about different prices, both above cost? Then the café with the higher price sells nothing, and it would do better by charging a cent less than its rival. Again someone wants to move.

What if both charge exactly $2? Each earns nothing on each cup. A café that raises its price loses every customer and still earns nothing. A café that cuts its price sells below cost and loses money. Nobody gains by moving.

The equilibrium\(p_A=p_B=MC=2\)

The only Nash equilibrium is for both cafés to charge marginal cost, and both earn zero profit. This is the . It's striking because there are only two firms, the same number that gave a price of 60 in Cournot competition. Two firms selling identical products on price behave like a perfectly competitive market.

The Week 6 cafés got stuck at $4 for the same reason. With only two prices to choose from, $4 was as far down as undercutting could go.

3.2

What the result assumes

The Bertrand result is a clean benchmark, and it's useful mainly because it shows what has to be true for price competition to be this fierce.

  • Identical products. Every customer switches for a one-cent difference. With brand loyalty, location or features, a price cut wins only some customers. Reading 4 treats this case.
  • Equal costs. If Café A's cost is $2 and Café B's is $2.50, Café A can charge just under $2.50, take every customer and earn almost 50 cents a cup. The price ends at the higher-cost firm's cost, not the lower one's.
  • Enough capacity. Undercutting pays because the undercutter can serve everyone. If it can't, the gain from cutting is much smaller. The next section treats this case.
  • One-shot play. If the firms meet every day, a price cut today can be punished tomorrow. Reading 5 treats this case.

Notice that the result doesn't depend on entry. Zero profit in Week 3 came from new firms entering until profit disappeared. Here it comes from two firms undercutting each other, with no entry at all.

Real price wars do happen in markets close to these assumptions: petrol stations on the same corner, online sellers of the same branded product, airlines on the same route in the off-season. Just as often, firms in such markets work hard to avoid the assumptions, through loyalty schemes, service, location and limits on capacity.

3.3

Capacity limits

Go back to AluStrong and MetaLite and change two things. They now compete on price, not quantity, and each has a smelter that can produce at most 40 tonnes. Demand is still \(Q=140-p\), and the marginal cost is still 20.

Is a price of 60 for both an equilibrium? At 60, buyers want \(140-60=80\) tonnes, exactly what the two smelters can produce together. Each firm sells 40.

  • Cut the price. AluStrong could charge 59 and attract every buyer, but it can supply only 40 tonnes, which it already sells at 60. The cut lowers its margin and adds no sales.
  • Raise the price. If AluStrong charges more than 60, MetaLite still sells its 40 tonnes. AluStrong faces the demand that's left, \(q_a=100-p\). Its profit is \((p-20)(100-p)\), which is largest at \(p=60\). Raising the price loses more in sales than it gains in margin.

So both firms charging 60 is an equilibrium. That's the Cournot price, not the Bertrand one. A removes the reason to undercut, because a firm can't win customers it can't serve.

This points to a way of reconciling the two models. When firms first choose capacity and then compete on price, the capacities they choose play the role of the quantities in Cournot competition, and the outcome looks like Cournot. When capacity is easy to expand, as for software or online services, price competition is closer to Bertrand.

Summary

When firms with equal costs and enough capacity sell identical products on price, any price above marginal cost invites an undercut. The only equilibrium is \(p=MC\), with zero profit, and two firms are enough: the Bertrand result. It needs identical products, equal costs, enough capacity and one-shot play. A capacity limit removes the gain from undercutting: AluStrong and MetaLite with 40 tonnes each hold the Cournot price of 60 even when they compete on price.

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