Read 5 of 5

Welfare and limits

Is price discrimination good or bad for buyers and for society?

Price discrimination has a bad name. The word sounds unfair, and some schemes do feel unfair. But the economics is more mixed than the name suggests.

One result from this week should bother you. Personalized pricing creates more value than uniform pricing, and it leaves consumers with nothing. So is it good or bad? To answer, we have to keep two questions apart: how much value a scheme creates, and who gets it.

This reading compares each scheme with uniform pricing, using the numbers we've already worked out. Then it turns to what customers and regulators think about it.

5.1

Ride On, scheme by scheme

The Ride On numbers let us compare every scheme on the same market.

SchemeRidesRide On profitConsumer surplusDeadweight loss
Uniform pricing, $260504545
Pass, plus $2 a ride6095045
Blocks, $2 then $110070655
Pass, plus 50 cents a ride12014000
Personalized pricing12014000

Three things stand out. First, every scheme beats uniform pricing for Ride On, which is why firms bother. Second, deadweight loss falls whenever the scheme sells more rides. The schemes that reach 120 rides remove it entirely. Third, consumers can lose or gain. A pass takes everything from identical kids. Block pricing leaves them better off than uniform pricing, because the second block only discounts rides they wouldn't have taken.

So "discrimination raises deadweight loss" is wrong as a general claim. Whether a scheme creates more value depends on whether it expands output toward the efficient quantity.

Who gets that value is a separate question, and the two can pull apart. From uniform pricing to personalized pricing, total surplus rises from $135 to $180, and consumer surplus falls from $45 to zero. Week 4 warned that total surplus says nothing about who gets the value. A regulator who cares only about total surplus would welcome personalized pricing. One who cares about consumers wouldn't. The economics tells us what each scheme does to each side. It doesn't tell us which side to care about.

5.2

Third degree can go either way

In Southern Ocean Lodge and Pasta Couture, total output doesn't change. The lodge fills 200 rooms either way because of its capacity. Pasta Couture sells 217,500 sweaters either way because both demands are linear and both groups buy under either scheme. Neither is a general result, but the logic is. When output stays the same, discrimination can only move units from buyers who value them more to buyers who value them less. So total surplus falls: by $1,125 a night at the lodge. For total surplus to rise, output has to rise.

That happens when third degree opens a market that uniform pricing would leave unserved. Suppose a drug costs $10 a dose. A million patients in rich countries would pay $100, and a million in poor countries would pay at most $30. A uniform price of $100 earns $90 million and a uniform price of $30 earns $40 million, so the firm charges $100 and patients in poor countries go without. With a fence that stops the cheaper drug flowing back, it can also sell at $30. Output doubles, profit rises by $20 million, and nobody in a rich country pays more.

5.3

Screening and welfare

The Flying Koala's best single fare is $300 unrestricted, which serves only business travelers and earns $450,000. That's its uniform-pricing benchmark. The screen adds 7,000 trips, each worth $40 more than it costs, so total surplus rises by $280,000. The airline gets $25,000 of that and business travelers get the other $255,000, $85 each. Tourists pay their full WTP, so they get no surplus either way. Nobody is worse off, and two groups are better off.

Screens have a cost, though. Restrictions that make the cheap version worse for the high type usually make it a little worse for the low type too, and making a product worse on purpose destroys value. A tourist who gets stuck with an unchangeable ticket when her plans change loses something real. Ride On's cheap pass does the same thing: it cuts an occasional rider from 12 rides to 8, and those four rides were worth $2 more than they cost.

5.4

Fairness, perception and the law

Customers care about how prices are set, not just how high they are. The Coca-Cola vending machine from Reading 2 is the classic case. A cold drink is worth more on a hot day, but charging more for it looked like taking advantage of thirsty people.

Discounts usually feel fair and surcharges don't, even when the prices are the same. A student discount is welcome; a "non-student surcharge" would not be. Customers also dislike prices they can't see. Phone bookers at the lodge would be annoyed to learn that online guests paid $75 less for the same room.

Regulators have started to look at personalized pricing online. We saw in Reading 2 what happened to Wish, and that sellers in the EU have to say when a price is personalized. Notice what that rule does. It doesn't ban personalized pricing, and it doesn't settle who should get the surplus. It makes sure customers know. Price discrimination isn't illegal in general, but hidden discrimination, and discrimination by protected characteristics such as race or sex, can be.

Who gains?

Question 1 of 1

Compared with uniform pricing at $2, which Ride On scheme makes kids better off?

Choose one answer.

5.5

Where this leaves us

All of this week's pricing assumed that customers are passive and that the firm has no rivals. Customers took the menu as given, and nobody else could undercut the price.

Neither assumption holds for long. Phone bookers learn to book online. A rival airline can offer business travelers an unrestricted fare at $200. Once the best price depends on what others do, the firm needs a way to think about other players who are thinking about it. That's the subject of Week 6.

Summary

Compared with uniform pricing, price discrimination always raises the firm's profit. How much value it creates depends on output, and who gets that value is a separate question: personalized pricing raises total surplus and leaves consumers with nothing. Schemes that expand output toward the efficient quantity, such as personalized pricing, a two-part tariff at marginal cost or block pricing, reduce deadweight loss. Third-degree discrimination that leaves output unchanged lowers total surplus, because units go to buyers who value them less. Customers judge fairness as well as price, and hidden personalized pricing draws regulators' attention.

Concept atlas