Read 1 of 5

Beyond uniform pricing

What does uniform pricing leave on the table, and what does it take to collect it?

Last week Ride On charged every kid $2 a ride. We call this uniform pricing: the price is uniform across all individuals. Some of those kids would have paid $3. Others valued a ride at $1, more than the 50 cents it costs, but didn't ride at all.

This week we drop uniform pricing. A firm with market power can reach the surplus that a uniform price leaves on the table in two ways. It can price discriminate, charging different customers, or different units, different prices. Or it can use other pricing schemes, such as a two-part tariff, that extract more from customers without discriminating. We'll study price discrimination first and then turn to the other schemes. Either way, the firm earns more, but customers may end up better off or worse off, depending on the method used.

This first reading asks what uniform pricing leaves on the table, what a firm needs before it can charge more than one price, and how to tell the main pricing schemes apart.

1.1

What uniform pricing leaves on the table

Recall Ride On's monopoly outcome. Demand is \(Q^d(p)=140-40p\), marginal cost is 50 cents, and Ride On sells 60 rides at $2. In Week 4 we split the surplus into three pieces.

AreaValue
Consumer surplusBelow demand, above $2, up to 60 rides45
Producer surplusAbove \(MC\), below $2, up to 60 rides90
Deadweight lossBelow demand, above \(MC\), from 60 to 120 rides45

Ride On would like a piece of the other two. The consumer-surplus triangle belongs to kids who'd pay more than $2. If Ride On could charge them more without affecting others, it would. The deadweight-loss triangle belongs to kids who'd pay something between 50 cents and $2.

Take the 90th kid in line from Week 4. They value a ride at \(p(90)=1.25\), and the ride costs 50 cents to run. At a price of $1, both sides would gain. But to sell that ride, Ride On would have to charge every kid $1, and the discount on the first 60 rides would cost more than the ride brings in. If it could charge the 90th kid $1 and leave everyone else at $2, it would.

Ride On's monopoly outcome from Week 4. The green part of demand is kids who ride and would pay more than $2. The red part is kids who'd pay more than the 50-cent cost but less than $2, and don't ride.

These are sometimes called the triangles of opportunity. A uniform price can't reach either of them, because any price change applies to everyone. That's exactly why marginal revenue lay below price in Week 4.

Charging different prices for the same good, when the difference isn't explained by a difference in cost, is called . A delivery firm that charges $5 more to reach a remote town because it costs $5 more isn't discriminating. One that charges $5 more because people there have no alternative is. In economics the word "discrimination" is descriptive. It means the firm treats buyers differently. Whether that is good or bad for buyers is a separate question, and Reading 5 takes it up.

1.2

What a firm needs before it can discriminate

A firm has to meet three conditions before it can price discriminate.

Market power. A price-taker sells at the market price or not at all. A firm that tried to charge some buyers more would simply lose them to a rival. So discrimination is only possible for a firm that sets its own price, as in Week 4.

A way to separate buyers. The firm has to charge different prices to different buyers, which means it needs some way of telling them apart. Sometimes it can see a label that is correlated with willingness to pay: an age, an address, a booking channel. Sometimes it can't, and it has to design options so that buyers separate themselves. We'll discuss both.

No arbitrage. means buying where the price is low and selling where it is high. If a low-price buyer can resell to a high-price buyer, the high price disappears. The same happens if a high-value buyer can simply join the low-price group. So the scheme needs a fence.

Fences come from several places. Services are hard to resell: you can't resell a haircut or a hotel night booked in your own name. Transport costs and import rules make it costly to move books or medicines from a cheap country to an expensive one. Contracts can forbid resale, as with software sold to universities at a discount. And firms can change the product a little, as with a student edition that lacks features a business user needs.

When a fence fails, the scheme fails with it. A cinema can offer a student price because it checks student cards at the door. An online shop that offered a student discount to anyone who clicked a box would soon find that all its customers were students.

1.3

Classify by what the firm knows

Pricing schemes are traditionally sorted into three "degrees", a classification due to Arthur C. PigouArthur Cecil Pigou (1877–1959) was an English economist at Cambridge. His work spans welfare economics, business cycles, unemployment, public finance and the measurement of national income. He is best known for the Pigouvian tax, a tax on activities that harm others.. The numbering isn't very helpful, so we'll also give each degree a plain name that says what it does. All three names answer one question: what does the firm know about each customer at the moment it sets the price?

DegreeWhat the firm knowsExamples
Personalized pricingEach individual's economic valueA negotiated price for a custom machine; a car dealer who sizes up each buyer; the pricing strategy of Wish.com
Menu pricingNothing about the individual, so it makes customers reveal themselvesA menu that customers choose from: fare classes, a Lite version, bulk discounts, coupons, early-bird prices
Group pricingCharacteristics of the individual, but not their economic valueStudent and senior tickets; prices that differ by country; phone and internet bookings

In first degree, the firm infers each customer's willingness to pay and charges each customer exactly that. In second degree, the firm knows nothing about the individual, so it can't assign prices at all. It offers a menu instead and lets customers choose. Their choices reveal something about them, and that self-selection is what we call screening. In third degree, the firm knows which group a customer belongs to, so it sets one price for each group.

Firms use many tools to build these schemes. The table lists the most common ones, though it isn't complete.

ToolHow it worksExample
QuantityThe price per unit falls for larger purchasesBulk packs; a lower price for every ride after the sixth
QualityDifferent qualities sell at different pricesEconomy and business class
TimeThe price depends on when you buyEarly-bird tickets; a new phone that gets cheaper a year later
CouponsOnly buyers who make the effort get the discountDiscount codes
VersioningA deliberately limited version sells for lessA Lite edition of software; streaming with ads
Mixed bundlingProducts sell separately and also as a cheaper packageA burger, fries and a drink as a meal deal
Pure bundlingProducts sell only as a packageA streaming service that sells its sports and movie channels only together

Some pricing schemes let a firm extract more from its customers without charging them different prices for the same good. Under pure bundling, the firm sells its products only as a package. Under a two-part tariff, every customer pays the same fixed fee plus the same per-unit fee. Neither has to be price discrimination, but both reach into the triangles of opportunity.

We'll work through all of this in the next readings: personalized pricing and the two-part tariff in Reading 2, menu pricing, with its tools and pure bundling, in Reading 3, and group pricing in Reading 4.

Classify by what the firm observes

Question 1 of 2

A cinema charges $12 for anyone over 65 and $18 for everyone else. Which kind of pricing is this?

Choose one answer.

Summary

Uniform pricing leaves consumer surplus with buyers who'd pay more and loses trades with buyers who'd pay less but more than marginal cost. Firms design pricing schemes to exploit the differences in customers' willingness to pay. Price discrimination requires market power, a way to separate buyers and a fence against arbitrage. Classify a scheme by what the firm knows: each customer's value (first degree), nothing, so customers choose from a menu (second degree, or screening), or customer characteristics (third degree).

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