Read 2 of 5

Personalized pricing

What can a firm do if it knows each customer's value, and how close can it get with one price list for everyone?

Start with the extreme case. Suppose Ride On knew exactly what every ride is worth to every kid. What would it charge, and how much would it earn?

The answer is a useful benchmark, even though almost no firm has that information. Then we'll see a surprise. If Ride On's customers are alike, a simple day pass gets Ride On all the way to the benchmark, with the same fees for every kid.

2.1

Ride On as ten kids

To talk about individual customers, we need individual demand. Suppose Ride On's customers are ten identical kids, and each kid's daily demand for rides is

One kid's demand\(q^d(p)=14-4p\)

Ten such kids give market demand \(Q^d(p)=10\times(14-4p)=140-40p\), the same as in Week 4. So every Week 4 number still holds: at $2, each kid takes 6 rides, the market takes 60, and Ride On earns $50 a day. Cost is still \(C(Q)=40+0.5Q\).

A kid's inverse demand is \(p(q)=3.5-q/4\). It reads the same way as in Week 4. A kid values their first ride at $3.25, their fourth at $2.50 and their twelfth at 50 cents. Each extra ride is worth a little less than the one before.

2.2

Personalized pricing

Now suppose Ride On could charge each kid, for each ride, exactly what that ride is worth to them. This is , or first-degree price discrimination.

How many rides should Ride On sell? Selling one more ride no longer lowers the price of any other ride, because every ride has its own price. So the extra ride adds its own value to revenue, and marginal revenue equals the demand price. Ride On keeps selling as long as a ride is worth at least the 50 cents it costs. A kid's twelfth ride is worth \(p(12)=3.5-3=0.5\), exactly the cost, and every later ride is worth less. So each kid rides 12 times and the market takes 120 rides, the efficient quantity from Week 4.

Ride On's revenue is the whole area under demand up to 120 rides. Its profit is the area between demand and marginal cost, less the rental:

\(\pi\)\(=\)\(\tfrac12\times120\times(3.5-0.5)-40\)Triangle between demand and \(MC\), less the rental.\(=\)\(180-40\)\(=\)\(140\)

Under uniform pricing, Ride On earned $50. Now it earns $140. Consumer surplus is zero, because every kid pays their full value for every ride. Deadweight loss is also zero, because every ride worth more than its cost takes place. The two triangles from Reading 1 both go to Ride On.

That second point is easy to miss. Personalized pricing is efficient. Total surplus is $180, the most these rides can create. The firm takes all of it. That's bad for kids, but as in Week 4, who gets the surplus is a different question from how much surplus there is.

2.3

Why it is rare

Personalized pricing needs the firm to know every customer's value for every unit. That's a lot of information. Customers have every reason to hide it, because revealing a high value only raises the price they pay.

It comes closest when each sale is negotiated. A firm selling a few custom machines, such as subsea robots to offshore drilling companies, talks to each buyer, learns about their project, and quotes a price for each. A car dealer who sizes up each buyer and haggles is trying to do the same thing.

Online sellers can now estimate individual values from browsing and purchase histories. They still face the other two conditions. Customers compare prices, share them and sometimes resent them, and regulators are watching. The online marketplace Wish set prices based on each consumer's purchase behavior and location, among other things, and according to the Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM), it didn't disclose this clearly enough. After the ACM stepped in, Wish blocked personalized pricing in the EU from May 25, 2022, and banned its merchants from advertising fake discounts (European Parliament study). Businesses there can use personalized prices only under strict transparency conditions. They have to say clearly, before the purchase, that prices are personalized, and customers have to understand how their personal information affects the price.

Personalized pricing is one form of dynamic pricing, which tries to capture willingness to pay as it changes with circumstances. In 1999, Coca-Cola's CEO Douglas Ivester confirmed that the company was testing vending machines that would raise the price of a soda on hotter days. Consumers and competitors, Pepsi among them, called it price gouging. The outrage forced Coca-Cola to back down and drop the plan.

Dynamic pricingWhat moves the priceExamples
Surge or yield managementA local spike in demand against a fixed, perishable supplyUber and Lyft, airlines, hotels
Contextual or behavioralSignals of urgency: device type, browsing history, even battery levelTravel booking sites, delivery apps
Surveillance or personalizedA full customer profile: purchase history, how often they buy, their expected lifetime valueDirect-to-consumer online retail, premium loyalty programs

Only the last row prices the individual, and that's where Wish sat. The Coca-Cola machine is closest to the first row: it would have charged everyone at the machine the same price on a given day. Reading 5 comes back to fairness and regulation.

2.4

A two-part tariff

Here is a scheme that charges every kid the same. Ride On sells a day pass. A kid who buys the pass can then ride for a per-unit fee of \(p\) per ride. A kid who doesn't buy the pass can't ride. This is a : a fixed fee for access and a per-unit fee for each unit used.

A two-part tariff isn't price discrimination. Every kid pays the same fixed fee and the same per-unit fee. Yet, as we'll see, it can end up exactly where personalized pricing does, with all of the consumer surplus going to the firm as profit.

Take the per-unit fee as given for now. A kid with a pass rides until the next ride is worth less than \(p\), so they take \(q=14-4p\) rides. Before paying for the pass, their surplus from those rides is the triangle below their demand and above \(p\). That's the most they'll pay for the pass. So Ride On sets the fixed fee \(F\) equal to that triangle, and the kid's consumer surplus, after paying \(F\), is zero.

A per-unit fee of $2. Each kid rides 6 times.

\(F\)\(=\)\(\tfrac12\times6\times(3.5-2)=4.5\)Fixed fee: the surplus from 6 rides.\(CS\)\(=\)\(4.5-F=0\)What the kid keeps after paying \(F\).\(\pi\)\(=\)\(10\times\bigl(F+(2-0.5)\times6\bigr)-40\)Ten fixed fees, plus per-unit fees net of the cost of rides, less the rental.\(=\)\(10\times13.5-40\)\(=\)\(95\)

That already beats the $50 from uniform pricing. But it isn't the best Ride On can do.

A per-unit fee equal to marginal cost. Each kid rides 12 times. Ride On makes nothing on the rides, but the fixed fee is much larger:

\(F\)\(=\)\(\tfrac12\times12\times(3.5-0.5)=18\)Fixed fee: the surplus from 12 rides.\(CS\)\(=\)\(18-F=0\)What the kid keeps after paying \(F\).\(\pi\)\(=\)\(10\times18-40\)Ten fixed fees, less the rental.\(=\)\(140\)

That's the profit from personalized pricing, and Ride On gets there charging every kid the same fees. Don't read too much into this. To set \(F\), Ride On has to know a kid's demand curve. Since the kids are identical, knowing that curve means knowing what every ride is worth to every kid, so there's nothing left to hide. The two-part tariff does as well as personalized pricing because the kids are alike. Reading 3 starts from what happens when they aren't.

Why is 50 cents the best per-unit fee? Go back to the $2 fee and cut it to $1. Each kid's margin on rides falls from \((2-0.5)\times6=9\) to \((1-0.5)\times10=5\), a loss of $4. But the fixed fee rises from $4.50 to $12.50, a gain of $8. So Ride On is $4 ahead on each kid.

Compare this with Week 4. There, a lower price meant a discount on every ride Ride On would have sold anyway, and that discount was lost. Here the discount comes back. A kid who pays less per ride has more surplus, and the fixed fee collects it. What's left is the value of the new rides. Rides 7 to 10 are worth \(\tfrac12\times4\times(1.5+0.5)=4\) more than they cost, which is exactly the $4. So a lower per-unit fee raises profit as long as it adds rides worth more than they cost, and that stops at marginal cost.

Start at a per-unit fee of $2 and predict whether a lower per-unit fee will raise or lower Ride On's profit. Drag the point down. The green area is the fixed fee, the red rectangle is the margin on rides, and the amber triangle is surplus nobody gets.

Two-part tariffs are very common.

  • Amusement parks. You pay for an entry ticket, then pay per ride or per game inside.
  • Gyms. You pay a monthly or annual membership, plus a fee for each personal training session or class. A basic plan with a flat fee and nothing per visit is the special case where the per-unit fee is zero.
  • Warehouse clubs. You pay an annual membership to shop at Costco, plus the price of each item at the register.
  • Utilities. Electricity, water and gas bills have a fixed supply charge, paid however much you use, and a per-unit fee for each kWh or kiloliter.

A two-part tariff needs a fence too. If one kid buys the pass and shares it with nine friends, Ride On collects one fixed fee instead of ten. That's why a day pass is usually a wristband, and why Costco checks membership cards at the door.

Here is a real electricity bill. For the 49 days from 12 March to 29 April, the supply charge is $1.2386 a day, or $60.69. The customer pays it every day, even while away on holiday. That's the fixed fee. Peak consumption costs $0.4513 per kWh, about 45 cents. That's the per-unit fee. The rates changed on 30 April, so the bill lists each charge twice.

An electricity bill for 12 March to 11 June 2026. From 12 March to 29 April, Peak Consumption is 174.851 kWh at $0.451264, or $78.90, Dedicated Circuit Consumption is 206.081 kWh at $0.22407, or $46.18, and the Supply Charge is 49 days at $1.2386, or $60.69. From 30 April to 11 June, the rates are $0.40172 and $0.178002 per kWh and $1.1132 a day. It also lists a solar buyback credit at $0.04 per kWh.Per-unit fee. 174.851 kWh × $0.451264 per kWh = $78.90. The more you use, the more you pay.Fixed fee. 49 days × $1.2386 a day = $60.69. It depends on the days in the period, not on how much you use.

Check the two-part tariff

Question 1 of 1

Ride On sets the per-unit fee at $1. What is the largest fixed fee each kid will pay, and what is daily profit?

Choose one answer.

Summary

Personalized pricing charges each buyer the value of each unit. The firm sells the efficient quantity and keeps the whole surplus: Ride On earns $140, with zero consumer surplus and zero deadweight loss. A two-part tariff charges every buyer the same fixed fee and per-unit fee, so it isn't price discrimination. With identical buyers, it gets the same result: set the per-unit fee at marginal cost and the fixed fee at each buyer's surplus. A lower per-unit fee doesn't lose money on existing units, because the fixed fee collects the discount back.

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