Read 3 of 5
Pricing by menu
How can a firm charge different customers different prices when it can't tell them apart?
In Reading 2 the kids were all alike, so one pass collected everything. Suppose they aren't. Some kids come to the mall only rarely, and we'll call them occasional riders. Others come every weekend, and we'll call them regulars. With a per-unit fee of 50 cents, the surplus of an occasional rider is $18 and that of a regular is $32. A fixed fee of $18 sells passes to everyone, but the regulars keep $14 each. A fixed fee of $32 takes everything from the regulars, but the occasional riders stay home. If Ride On could tell them apart, it would charge each their own fee. It can't.
Airlines have the same problem. They can't see who is flying for business. A business traveler and a tourist look the same on the booking page. Yet airlines manage to charge them very different prices.
They do it by offering a menu and letting travelers choose. This reading builds the menu carefully, shows why it has to leave the high-value customers some surplus, and shows when a menu isn't worth offering at all. Then it comes back to Ride On's kids.
3.1
The Flying Koala
The Flying Koala flies between Melbourne and Sydney. It carries 10,000 passengers a day: 3,000 business travelers and 7,000 tourists. It sells two kinds of ticket. A restricted ticket can't be changed or refunded. An unrestricted ticket can. The unrestricted ticket costs more to provide, because the airline has to hold seats open for passengers who change plans.
| Restricted | Unrestricted | |
|---|---|---|
| Tourist WTP | $140 | $175 |
| Business WTP | $225 | $300 |
| Cost to the airline | $100 | $150 |
Business travelers value both tickets more, and they value flexibility a lot more: $75 against the tourists' $35.
3.2
If the airline could tell them apart
Suppose the airline could see each passenger's type. It could send tourists and business travelers to different ticket counters and charge each counter its own prices. Then it would sell each type the ticket with the larger margin, at that type's full WTP. For a tourist, a restricted ticket at $140 earns $40 and an unrestricted one at $175 earns $25, so tourists get restricted tickets. For a business traveler, restricted at $225 earns $125 and unrestricted at $300 earns $150, so business travelers get unrestricted tickets. So the profit under full information, \(\pi^f\), is
That's group pricing (third degree), which we'll study in Reading 4. The separate counters tell the airline exactly who is a tourist and who is a business traveler. In practice it can't tell them apart: both look the same on the booking page.
3.3
The same fares at one counter
Now the airline can't identify tourists and business travelers, so there's only one ticket counter instead of two. It posts both fares there, and every passenger can buy either ticket. Try the same fares as before, $140 restricted and $300 unrestricted. These are the full-information prices: each type pays its full WTP for the ticket meant for it, so the airline hopes to earn \(\pi^f\) again.
Every passenger compares the two tickets and buys the one that leaves the larger surplus. A tourist gets \(140-140=0\) from restricted. Unrestricted would leave her \(175-300\lt0\), because the $300 fare is more than her WTP of $175. So tourists buy restricted, as planned. A business traveler gets a surplus of \(225-140=85\) from restricted and \(300-300=0\) from unrestricted. Because restricted leaves her more surplus than unrestricted, she buys restricted too. Every passenger buys a $140 ticket, and the airline earns \(10{,}000\times40=400{,}000\).
With a single counter, the cheap option meant for tourists is also available to business travelers. To make business travelers pick the expensive option, the airline has to make it at least as attractive to them as the cheap one.
3.4
Designing the menu
A is a menu designed so that each type chooses the option meant for it. Here the airline wants tourists on restricted fares and business travelers on unrestricted ones. Call the fares \(p_r\) and \(p_u\).
Tourists should buy restricted and still want to fly, so \(p_r\le140\). The airline might as well charge $140. Tourists also shouldn't buy unrestricted. Their surplus from unrestricted must be less than their surplus from restricted:
Business travelers should prefer unrestricted. Their surplus from unrestricted must be at least their surplus from restricted:
This is called the constraint. The highest fare that keeps business travelers on unrestricted tickets is $215. Since $215 is above $175, tourists still don't buy unrestricted, so a fare of $215 keeps both types on the ticket meant for them.
Notice which constraint did the work. The tourists' constraint is met with room to spare. The business travelers' constraint is what sets the fare. That's the usual pattern. Low-value customers aren't tempted by the expensive option, but high-value customers are tempted by the cheap one, so the menu is built to stop them.
Let's work out The Flying Koala's profit from this screen, \(\pi^{\text{screen}}\):
The screen earns $475,000, against $400,000 for the full-information prices. But there's another option to check. The airline could drop tourists and sell only unrestricted tickets at $300, with the restricted fare set so high that nobody buys it. Business travelers pay their full $300, tourists don't fly, and profit is \(3{,}000\times150=450{,}000\). The screen beats that by $25,000, so the airline should offer the screen.
Is this price discrimination? The two tickets aren't the same good, and the unrestricted one costs $50 more to provide. But the fares differ by $75. The first $50 of the gap reflects cost, and the other $25 doesn't. The airline earns a margin of $40 on a restricted ticket and $65 on an unrestricted one, and that difference is the price discrimination.
3.5
Why business travelers keep $85
Under the screen, each business traveler pays $215 for a ticket worth $300 to her. She keeps $85. Under full information she'd have kept nothing. Why can't the airline take that $85?
Because the restricted fare is on the menu, and it's worth $85 to her. Any attempt to charge her more for unrestricted sends her to restricted. The $85 is what the airline pays to get business travelers to reveal themselves. Economists call it an information rent.
That gives the airline two ways to shrink it. It can raise the restricted fare, but tourists won't pay more than $140. Or it can make the restricted ticket worse for business travelers. That's why restricted fares come with rules a tourist barely notices and a business traveler hates: no changes, no refunds, a Saturday night stay. Each rule lowers the business traveler's value of the restricted ticket and so loosens the constraint.
Change the passengers
On a different route, half of the 10,000 passengers fly for business. Values and costs are unchanged. What should the airline do?
The screen earns \(5{,}000\times40+5{,}000\times65=525{,}000\). Selling only to business travelers at $300 earns \(5{,}000\times150=750{,}000\). With more business travelers, the $85 each one keeps under the screen costs more than the tourists bring in. So the airline drops the tourists.
Back to 3,000 business travelers. The airline adds a rule to restricted tickets that cuts business travelers' value of them from $225 to $195. Tourists don't care about the rule. What is the new screen profit?
The constraint becomes \(300-p_u\geq195-140=55\), so \(p_u\le245\). Profit is \(7{,}000\times40+3{,}000\times95=565{,}000\). Making the cheap ticket worse for the high type, and only for the high type, lets the airline charge it more.
3.6
When a menu doesn't pay
A screen isn't always worth offering. Should The Flying Koala serve tourists at all? Each tourist it serves adds $40 of profit. But putting the restricted fare on the menu hands each business traveler $85 that the airline would otherwise have collected. So the screen pays only if \(7{,}000\times40\) is more than \(3{,}000\times85\). It is, \(280{,}000\) against \(255{,}000\), and the difference is the $25,000 we found.
The same comparison works for any mix of passengers. If a share \(s\) of passengers fly for business, the screen pays only if \(40(1-s)>85s\), which means \(s\lt40/125=0.32\). The Flying Koala, at 30%, is close to the edge. That's why the route with half business travelers, in the first question above, drops the tourists.
The practice problem Tennis Racquets shows another way a menu can fail. There, the professionals value both racquets more, but the veterans value the quality upgrade more: $40 against $30. That reverses the usual pattern, so a menu can't put professionals on the high-quality racquet.
So check the alternatives every time: the screen, selling only to the high type, and a single product for everyone.
3.7
Other ways to build a menu
Fare classes are one kind of menu. Firms build menus in other ways too. In each one the firm observes nothing about the individual, and customers reveal themselves by what they choose.
. Sell a full version and a limited one. Software comes in home and professional editions; streaming comes with and without ads. Sometimes the limited version costs as much to make as the full one, which tells you it exists to screen. The restricted airfare is a version.
. Sell products separately and also as a cheaper package. A burger, fries and a drink cost less as a meal deal. Customers who want all three reveal it by buying the deal, and customers who want only the burger pay the burger price.
Coupons. A coupon is a discount for anyone willing to find it, clip it or enter the code. Customers who bother are mostly the price-sensitive ones, because the discount is worth more to them than the time it takes. Customers who care less about the price don't bother, and they pay in full.
. Charge a high price at launch and lower it later, or sell early-bird tickets cheaply. Eager customers buy early at the high price, and patient customers wait. Customers choose when to buy, so this is a screen.
Quantity discounts. Textbooks often describe second degree as quantity discounts. These are screens too: a buyer who chooses the large pack, or the plan for big users, reveals that she uses a lot. The next section shows how this works at Ride On.
Pure bundling, which sells products only as a package, looks similar, but it isn't a menu. Nobody chooses anything, so nobody reveals anything. It works for a different reason. Suppose a streaming service has two customers and zero marginal cost. Alice values its sports channel at $60 and its movie channel at $20. Ben values sports at $20 and movies at $60. Priced separately, each channel earns the most at $60, sold to one customer, for $120 in total. A bundle is worth $80 to both, so a bundle at $80 sells twice and earns $160.
The two channels are spread out in value, but the bundle isn't. Bundling makes the customers alike, and we saw in Reading 2 that a firm can collect more from customers who are alike. This depends on the values moving in opposite directions. If Alice valued both channels at $60 and Ben valued both at $20, a bundle would be worth $120 to one and $40 to the other, and bundling would add nothing.
3.8
Quantity discounts at Ride On
Go back to Ride On's ten identical kids from Reading 2. Suppose Ride On charges $2 for each of a kid's first 6 rides and $1 for every ride after that. This is .
A kid takes their first 6 rides at $2, as before. Then rides 7 to 10 are worth more than $1 to them, so they take those too and stop at 10. Per kid, revenue is \(6\times2+4\times1=16\) and cost is \(10\times0.5=5\), so
Ride On earns $70 instead of $50, and kids gain too. Each keeps the $4.50 of surplus they had on their first 6 rides, plus \(\tfrac12\times4\times(2-1)=2\) on the four cheaper rides. The discount only applies to rides the kid wouldn't otherwise take, so Ride On sells more without giving away anything on the rides it already sold. That's how block pricing gets around the problem behind marginal revenue in Week 4.
Now come back to the kids who differ, from the start of this reading. An occasional rider's demand is \(q=14-4p\), the kid from Reading 2. A regular's demand is \(q=18-4p\). Suppose there are five of each. At a per-unit fee of 50 cents, an occasional rider takes 12 rides with a surplus of \(\tfrac12\times12\times3=18\), and a regular takes 16 rides with a surplus of \(\tfrac12\times16\times4=32\). One pass at a fixed fee of $18 earns \(10\times18-40=140\). The best single pass, a fixed fee of $12.50 with rides at $1, earns $145.
A menu does better. Offer a cheap pass at $8 with rides at $1.50, and an expensive pass at $22 with rides at 50 cents.
An occasional rider on the cheap pass takes 8 rides worth \(\tfrac12\times8\times2=8\) in surplus, exactly the fixed fee. The expensive pass would give them $18 of surplus for a fixed fee of $22, so they stay on the cheap one. A regular on the expensive pass has $32 of surplus and keeps \(32-22=10\). On the cheap pass, they'd take 12 rides for a surplus of \(\tfrac12\times12\times3=18\), and they'd keep \(18-8=10\) there too. Ties go to the expensive pass, so regulars buy it.
Each occasional rider brings in the $8 fixed fee and \((1.5-0.5)\times8=8\) on rides. Each regular brings in the $22 fixed fee and nothing on rides.
Ride On earns $150. This is The Flying Koala again. The regulars keep $10, their information rent. The cheap pass plays the role of the restricted ticket: its high per-unit fee cuts an occasional rider from 12 rides to 8, which makes the pass less attractive to a regular, who'd ride more on it.
A block schedule sorts customers the same way, because heavy users reach the cheap block and light users don't. Utilities, phone plans and wholesalers often use blocks.
3.9
The Book Oasis pricing puzzle
Book Oasis sells an e-reader with a high-resolution screen, adjustable lighting and access to a large ebook store. Each of the following is a pricing tool. Which tool is each one?
Name the tool
A discount on the e-reader when it is bought together with a selection of popular ebooks.
Bundling. The e-reader and the ebooks are sold together for less than their separate prices. Customers who want both choose the package; others buy the e-reader alone.
A Lite e-reader with less storage and a black-and-white screen, at a lower price.
Versioning. The Lite model is a deliberately limited version. Customers who care about storage and color choose the full model and reveal a higher value.
A limited-time voucher code for a percentage off the e-reader.
Coupons. Only customers who find and use the code get the discount. The effort sorts out the price-sensitive ones.
A free protective case with every e-reader.
Bundling. The case and the e-reader are sold as one package at one price. Nobody chooses anything, so this one is pure bundling.
A holiday promotion with a special price on the e-reader.
Intertemporal pricing. The price depends on when you buy. Customers who are willing to wait for the promotion pay less.
A price cut over the Christmas period only.
Intertemporal pricing again. Customers choose whether to buy before Christmas at the full price or during the cut.
A package with the e-reader and a gift certificate for the ebook store.
Bundling. The e-reader and store credit are sold together.
A family plan that allows several users, each with their own profile and library.
Versioning. The family plan is a richer version of the same product. Households with several readers choose it and reveal that they value the product more.
Book Oasis never learns who its customers are. The Lite model, the voucher and the holiday price give them a choice, and they sort themselves. The free case is different: everyone gets it, so it sorts nobody.
Summary