Read 4 of 5
Pricing by group
How should a firm price two groups it can tell apart?
Often a firm can't see what each customer would pay, but it can see characteristics that tell it which group a customer belongs to. A cinema sees age. A publisher sees the country an order ships to. A hotel sees whether a booking came by phone or online. What matters is that a customer in one group can't pass as a member of another. A retiree can't buy a student ticket, because they can't show a student ID.
Third-degree price discrimination sets one price for each group. We'll start with a firm whose prices look wrong, and find the rule by fixing them. Then we'll do the full analysis with the groups' demands, and add a capacity limit.
4.1
What group pricing needs
To price by group, a firm has to do three things.
- Segment customers by price sensitivity. Segmentation divides customers into groups that share a trait, such as age, location or booking channel. For pricing, the groups must also differ in price elasticity. If every group responds to price the same way, one price already gives the same marginal revenue in each group, and nothing is gained by splitting them. When elasticities differ, a uniform price leaves marginal revenues unequal, and the firm can raise profit by charging the less elastic group more and the more elastic group less.
- Identify each customer's group. The group has to show up in something the firm can check at the moment of sale: a student ID, a seniors card, proof of age, a billing address. Identification is what lets the firm set a price for each group directly. Without it, the firm would have to screen customers by offering a menu and letting them sort themselves.
- No arbitrage opportunities. The low-price group must not be able to resell to the high-price group. A student who buys a cheap ticket mustn't be able to sell it on to an adult. If resale is easy, students buy at the low price and sell at a price in between. Adults then buy from students, the firm's high-price sales disappear, and the two prices collapse toward one. Resale is hard when the good is a service used on the spot, when it is tied to the buyer, or when it appeals to only one group.
You'll see group pricing almost everywhere:
- Cinemas and museums charge less to students, children and seniors.
- Streaming and software services such as Spotify and Apple Music offer cheaper monthly plans to verified students.
- Shops and restaurants give 10% off to students, seniors or members of the armed forces.
- Digital goods priced by country. The same streaming plan, software license or textbook costs less in poorer countries than in richer ones. Netflix prices its plans country by country.
4.2
Pasta Couture: are these prices right?
Pasta Couture sells men's cashmere sweaters through two store chains. One serves young buyers and the other mature buyers. The sweaters are dyed in patterns that appeal to one group and not the other, so a young buyer won't shop at the mature chain, and the costs are the same for both.
Young buyers bought 50,000 sweaters last year at $120. A marketing study says a 1% price rise would cut young sales by 1.2%, so \(\varepsilon^y=-1.2\). Mature buyers bought 60,000 at $340, and the study puts their marginal revenue at $280.
Look at the last sweater sold in each chain. The Week 4 formula gives marginal revenue from the price and the elasticity, so the last young sweater adds \(120(1-1/1.2)=20\) to revenue. The last mature sweater adds $280.
Now move one sweater from the young chain to the mature chain. Pasta Couture sells the same number of sweaters, so its cost doesn't change. Revenue falls by about $20 in the young chain and rises by about $280 in the mature chain, so profit rises by about $260. We don't even need to know marginal cost to say that.
The answer surprises people, because the young price is already low. But a low price isn't the problem. At $120, young demand is close to unit elastic, so the last young sweater adds very little to revenue. Pasta Couture should raise the young price and lower the mature price, selling fewer sweaters to the young and more to the mature.
4.3
Equal marginal revenues in every market
Pasta Couture's problem is the general one. In , the firm sells the same good in two or more separated markets. Each market has its own demand, and the firm charges one price in each. Its cost depends on total output, not on where the output goes.
So the firm has two decisions: how to split its output between the markets, and how much to produce in total.
Take the split first. With total output fixed, cost is fixed too, so the best split is the one with the most revenue. Keep moving sweaters from the young chain to the mature chain. As the young chain sells fewer, its marginal revenue rises. As the mature chain sells more, its marginal revenue falls. The gain from moving one more sweater shrinks, and it reaches zero when the two marginal revenues are equal. So with markets A and B, the best split satisfies
Now ask whether to produce one more unit. Wherever it goes, it adds the common marginal revenue. It also adds marginal cost. So the firm expands while the common marginal revenue exceeds marginal cost, and stops when
Then it reads each price off that market's own demand. It's the Week 4 rule applied twice, tied together by one marginal cost.
4.4
The more elastic group pays less
Which group should get the lower price? The Week 4 formula writes marginal revenue in terms of price and elasticity, so we can turn the allocation rule into a rule about prices:
Suppose market A is the more elastic one at the current prices and quantities, say \(\varepsilon_A=-3\) and \(\varepsilon_B=-1.5\). Then \(1+1/\varepsilon_A=\frac{2}{3}\) and \(1+1/\varepsilon_B=\frac{1}{3}\), so \(p_A/p_B=\frac{1}{2}\). Market A pays half as much. That's true in general: the more elastic the demand, the closer \(1/\varepsilon\) is to zero, the larger \(1+1/\varepsilon\) is, and the lower the price has to be. The segment with the more elastic demand gets the lower price.
This is also why a uniform price leaves money on the table. A uniform price makes the prices equal. Marginal revenue is \(p(1+1/\varepsilon)\), so when the elasticities differ, equal prices mean unequal marginal revenues. Then moving a unit from one group to the other raises revenue.
Now apply the rule to Pasta Couture. We know the young elasticity, \(\varepsilon^y=-1.2\). For mature buyers we know marginal revenue instead, but the same formula gives their elasticity:
At current prices, mature buyers are far more elastic than young buyers, yet they pay almost three times as much. The rule says the more elastic segment should pay less, so these prices can't maximize profit. That's what moving one sweater told us.
4.5
Pasta Couture: full demands
A second study estimates the inverse demands, and the accounts give the cost:
Both demands are linear, so marginal revenue has the same intercept and twice the slope: \(MR_y=220-q_y/250\) and \(MR_m=400-q_m/500\). Marginal cost is constant at 50, so the pricing rule pins down each market directly:
Young buyers pay $135 and mature buyers $225. Annual profit is
Didn't the elasticity check say to sell fewer sweaters to the young? It did, starting from the old prices. The old numbers sit on these demand curves: \(p_y(50{,}000)=120\) and \(p_m(60{,}000)=340\), with \(MR_m(60{,}000)=280\). Moving from 50,000 to 42,500 young sweaters is the reallocation that moving one sweater pointed to. Mature sales also rise a lot, from 60,000 to 175,000, because the old mature price of $340 was far too high.
Check the answer with the markup rule from Week 4, applied to each market. At the optimum, elasticity is \(-500\times135/42{,}500\approx-1.59\) for the young and \(-1{,}000\times225/175{,}000\approx-1.29\) for the mature. The young markup is \((135-50)/135\approx0.63\), and the mature markup is \((225-50)/225\approx0.78\). The more elastic group gets the lower markup.
Notice that the order has flipped. At the old prices, the mature buyers were the more elastic group. At the optimum, they're the less elastic one. As in Week 4, elasticity belongs to a point on the demand curve, so the rule has to be applied where the firm ends up.
4.6
Southern Ocean Lodge: a capacity limit
Southern Ocean Lodge is a luxury retreat on Kangaroo Island, with no close competitor. Its daily demand is \(Q^d(p)=700-2.5p\) rooms, its marginal cost is $80 a room night, and it has 200 rooms.
With uniform pricing, inverse demand is \(p(Q)=280-0.4Q\) and \(MR(Q)=280-0.8Q\). Setting \(MR=80\) gives 250 rooms, more than the lodge has. At the capacity, \(MR(200)=120>80\), so the lodge fills all 200 rooms at \(p(200)=200\) dollars, just like the hotdog vendor in Week 4.
Then a market survey finds that guests who book by phone are much less price-sensitive than guests who book online. Phone demand is \(q_t=200-0.5p_t\) and internet demand is \(q_i=500-2p_i\). The two add up to \(700-2.5p\), so at $200 each channel takes 100 rooms. In inverse form,
Start at the uniform price, with 100 rooms in each channel. There, \(MR_t(100)=0\) and \(MR_i(100)=150\). The last phone room adds nothing to revenue, and the last internet room adds $150. So moving one room online raises revenue by about $150, which is the money a uniform price leaves on the table.
Without a capacity limit, the pricing rule would give \(400-4q_t=80\), so \(q_t=80\), and \(250-q_i=80\), so \(q_i=170\). That's 250 rooms again. The lodge has 200.
With 200 rooms, the two channels compete for the same rooms, so the allocation rule does the work. The allocation rule and the capacity give two equations:
The common marginal revenue is \(MR_t(70)=400-280=120\), above marginal cost, so filling every room is still right. The prices come from each channel's demand: \(p_t=400-2\times70=260\) and \(p_i=250-130/2=185\).
A common error is to set \(MR=MC\) in each channel anyway and report 80 and 170. That plan needs 250 rooms. With a binding capacity, the right comparison is between the channels, not with marginal cost.
The extra $40 between the common marginal revenue of 120 and the marginal cost of 80 is what one more room would add to profit. If the lodge could build a room for less than that, per night, it should.
A storm closes 50 rooms
A storm damages one wing, and the lodge can only offer 150 rooms for a season. What happens to the two prices?
With capacity 150, the allocation rule gives \(4q_t-(150-q_t)=150\), so \(q_t=60\) and \(q_i=90\). Prices are \(p_t=400-120=280\) and \(p_i=250-45=205\). Both rise by $20. Phone loses 10 rooms and internet loses 40, because internet demand is flatter: it takes a bigger change in rooms to move its price by the same amount.
4.7
Who wins and who loses
Compare the lodge's two pricing schemes.
| Uniform pricing | Two prices | |
|---|---|---|
| Phone price and rooms | $200, 100 | $260, 70 |
| Internet price and rooms | $200, 100 | $185, 130 |
| Phone consumer surplus | 10,000 | 4,900 |
| Internet consumer surplus | 2,500 | 4,225 |
| Revenue | 40,000 | 42,250 |
Internet bookers gain and phone bookers lose. The lodge's revenue rises by $2,250 a night, and since it sells the same 200 rooms, so does its profit. Consumers as a whole lose $3,375, more than the lodge gains. Thirty rooms have moved from phone guests, who valued them at between $200 and $260, to internet guests, who value them at between $185 and $200. Total surplus falls by $1,125.
Pasta Couture shows the same pattern. With uniform pricing, demand adds up to \(Q=510{,}000-1{,}500p\), so \(p=340-Q/1{,}500\) and \(MR=340-Q/750\). Setting \(MR=50\) gives 217,500 sweaters at $195. With two prices it sells the same total, but young buyers pay $135 instead of $195 and mature buyers pay $225 instead of $195. The young gain, and the mature lose.
Notice which group gets the lower price. It isn't the group with the lower demand. Mature demand for sweaters is much larger, and phone demand for rooms is much smaller, yet in both cases the less elastic group pays more. What matters is how strongly each group responds to price, exactly as in the markup rule.
4.8
How secure is the fence?
The lodge's scheme depends on phone bookers not switching to the internet. A hotel night can't be resold, so classic arbitrage isn't a worry. Switching channels is. Once phone bookers learn that the same room is $75 cheaper online, many will book online. The lodge might keep some phone business with services only phone guests get, or because phone bookers are travel agents booking for clients. But the fence is weak, and the scheme may also hurt the lodge's reputation with guests who find out they paid more.
Pasta Couture's fence is stronger, because it's built into the product. The dye patterns make a sweater appealing to one group and not the other, so a mature buyer gains nothing by shopping at the young chain.
Summary