Read 4 of 5

What monopoly costs

Who gains and who loses when a firm sets its own price?

So far we've analyzed what a monopolist does. Now we evaluate the outcome in terms of the total surplus (welfare) it creates. In Week 1, the gain from one exchange was the buyer's surplus plus the seller's surplus. Here we add those gains up across a whole market, and compare Ride On's choice with the outcome that would create the most value.

The comparison separates two things that are easy to confuse. One is the profit the monopolist earns, which is mostly a transfer from buyers to the firm. The other is value that nobody gets, because some trades that would benefit both sides never happen.

4.1

Surplus at market scale: Welfare

In Week 1, a buyer's surplus from one trade was \(WTP-p\). In Reading 1 we saw that each point on Ride On's demand curve is the WTP of one child. So we can add up surplus child by child.

At a price of $2, the 20th child in line values a ride at \(p(20)=3\), pays $2 and gains $1. The 40th child values it at $2.50 and gains 50 cents. The 60th child values it at exactly $2 and gains nothing. Adding up the gains of every child who rides gives the area below the demand curve and above the price. This is , \(CS\).

The seller's side works the same way. Each ride brings in the price and costs its marginal cost. Adding up \(p-MC\) over every ride sold gives the area above marginal cost and below the price. This is , \(PS\).

Producer surplus is not quite profit. It counts only the costs that change with output, so it leaves out the fixed cost:

Producer surplus and profit\(PS=\pi+\text{fixed cost}\)

Total surplus, \(CS+PS\), measures the value the market creates compared with no trade at all. It says nothing about who gets that value. A dollar moved from buyers to the seller leaves total surplus unchanged. That's a real limitation, and it's why arguments about monopoly can't rest on total surplus alone.

4.2

The efficient benchmark

To judge Ride On's choice, we need something to compare it with. Which rides are worth providing? A ride is worth providing if some child values it at more than the 50 cents it costs to run. Demand reaches 50 cents at \(Q=140-40\times0.5=120\) rides. So every ride up to the 120th creates value, and every ride beyond it would cost more than it's worth to the child who takes it. The efficient number of rides is 120.

This is also what competition among firms with Ride On's marginal cost would produce. As we saw in Week 3, competition pushes the price down until it equals the cost of producing one more unit. At a price of 50 cents, children take 120 rides.

We leave the mall rental out of this comparison. It's paid whether Ride On runs 60 rides or 120, so it doesn't change which rides are worth running. The last section of this reading comes back to it, because it matters for whether the efficient outcome can actually be reached.

4.3

Ride On against the benchmark

Demand reaches zero at a price of $3.50, so each consumer-surplus area is a triangle.

Monopoly, with \(p=2\) and \(Q=60\):

\(CS^m\)\(=\)\(\tfrac12(3.5-2)\times60\)Triangle below demand and above \(p=2\).\(=\)\(45\)
\(PS^m\)\(=\)\((2-0.5)\times60\)Rectangle above \(MC\) and below \(p=2\).\(=\)\(90\)

Producer surplus of $90 minus the rental of $40 is the profit of $50 from Reading 3.

Efficient outcome, with \(p=0.5\) and \(Q=120\):

\(CS^c\)\(=\)\(\tfrac12(3.5-0.5)\times120\)Triangle below demand and above \(p=0.5\).\(=\)\(180\)

and \(PS^c=0\), because the price equals marginal cost on every ride.

MonopolyEfficient
Price2.000.50
Rides per day60120
Consumer surplus45180
Producer surplus900
Total surplus135180

Monopoly creates $135 of value a day. The efficient outcome creates $180.

4.4

Deadweight loss

Read the table from the children's side. Consumer surplus falls from $180 to $45 under monopoly, a loss of $135. Where does it go?

Ninety dollars of it goes to Ride On as producer surplus. Those are the 60 children who ride either way, now paying $2 instead of 50 cents. That part is a transfer. It changes who gets the value, not how much value there is.

The remaining $45 goes to nobody. It's the : the value of the rides between the 60th and the 120th that never happen. Take the 90th child in line. That child values a ride at \(p(90)=1.25\), and the ride would cost Ride On 50 cents to run. The child would gladly pay $1, and Ride On would make 50 cents on the ride. Both would gain, but the trade doesn't happen. To sell that ride at $1, Ride On would have to charge every child $1, and the discount on the first 60 rides would cost more than that ride brings in.

Geometrically, the deadweight loss is the triangle between demand and marginal cost over those missing rides:

\(DWL\)\(=\)\(\tfrac12(120-60)\times(2-0.5)\)Half of base times height.\(=\)\(45\)

which matches \(180-135=45\). So the social cost of monopoly isn't the monopolist's profit. It's the trades that a single monopoly price rules out. Notice that the source of the problem is the single price. If Ride On could charge the 90th child $1 without lowering the price for anyone else, it would. Week 5 asks what happens when firms can do something like that.

Start with no cap and identify consumer surplus, producer surplus and deadweight loss. Then lower the price cap step by step. Predict what happens to the number of rides before you move the slider.

4.5

A price cap on a monopolist

In Week 3, a price ceiling on roses reduced the number of roses sold and created a shortage. A cap on a monopolist can do the opposite.

Suppose the mall caps rides at $1.50. Demand at $1.50 is \(140-60=80\) rides. For each of the first 80 rides, demand would allow a price above $1.50, but the cap stops Ride On from charging it. So up to 80 rides, the price is $1.50 whatever Ride On does, and selling one more ride doesn't lower the price of the others. Marginal revenue is simply $1.50 for each of those rides.

That's above the marginal cost of 50 cents, so Ride On sells all 80. Beyond 80 rides the price would have to fall below the cap, and marginal revenue drops back to \(3.5-Q/20\), which is \(-0.50\) at 80. So Ride On stops at 80.

\(CS\)\(=\)\(\tfrac12(3.5-1.5)\times80=80\)Consumer surplus with the cap.\(PS\)\(=\)\((1.5-0.5)\times80=80\)Producer surplus with the cap.\(DWL\)\(=\)\(\tfrac12(120-80)\times(1.5-0.5)=20\)The rides still missing.

Output rises from 60 to 80, consumer surplus rises from $45 to $80, and deadweight loss falls from $45 to $20. The cap works because it removes the reason the monopolist restricts output: selling more no longer means cutting the price on rides it would have sold anyway.

Two limits apply. A cap below marginal cost would make Ride On cut output, as the roses ceiling did. And because of the rental, the cap has to leave Ride On a non-negative profit. Below about 88 cents, producer surplus falls short of $40, Ride On would rather close the rides, and every child loses. The in-class exercise Fenway Hotdogs works through the same logic with different numbers.

4.6

Patents and the dilemma

If monopoly creates a deadweight loss, why do governments create monopolies on purpose? A gives an inventor the right to stop others from making or selling an invention for a limited period, typically 20 years. It's a legal entry barrier, created by design.

The case for patents is about incentives over time. Developing a new medicine can cost hundreds of millions of dollars, much of it on candidates that fail. Once the medicine exists, copying it can cost very little. If rivals could copy it immediately, competition would push the price down toward the cost of manufacturing, and the inventor would never recover the research cost. Anticipating this, a firm might not invest in the first place. With a patent, society accepts a deadweight loss later in exchange for getting the medicine at all.

Patents also require disclosure. To get one, the inventor must publish how the invention works. Others can build on that knowledge right away and can produce the invention freely once the patent expires. Without patents, firms might rely on secrecy, which slows the spread of knowledge.

The case against patents is that the protection can be too strong. Long or broad patents can protect profits well after the research cost has been recovered, and small changes to an existing product can extend protection. That's why governments limit patent terms, regulate some prices and negotiate access to essential medicines.

Our framework measures one side of this trade-off well and the other badly. The deadweight loss during the patent is easy to calculate, as we did for Ride On. The value of medicines that would never have been developed without patent protection is much harder to measure. Be clear about this before arguing for either side.

The two videos below give different perspectives on patents in the pharmaceutical industry. The first argues that patents are an important incentive for innovation. The second argues that the current patent system is broken and needs reform.

F.M. Scherer: how patents support innovation
Priti Krishtel: why drug prices are so high

Summary

Consumer surplus is the area below demand and above price. Producer surplus is the area above marginal cost and below price, and equals profit plus fixed cost. Ride On's monopoly reduces total surplus from $180 to $135. Of the $135 that consumers lose, $90 is a transfer to Ride On and $45 is deadweight loss: rides worth more than they cost that never happen. A price cap between marginal cost and the monopoly price can raise output and reduce that loss, as long as the firm still covers its costs. Patents create deadweight loss, but they reward invention and require disclosure.

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