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Market power

What does it take for a firm to set its own price?

In competitive markets, no firm chose its price. Each Auto Eco firm took the market price as given and decided only how much to produce. Even Portakal's island farms, which kept earning a profit, couldn't charge a cent above the market price. If one of them had tried, buyers would have bought from the other forty-nine.

This week we study a firm that serves the whole market, so the market's demand curve is its own demand curve. That single change has a large consequence. If the firm wants to sell more, it has to charge less, and if it wants to charge more, it has to sell less.

This first reading sets up the model. We ask what gives a firm this kind of power, how durable the power is, and how the firm chooses its price and quantity. We also meet Ride On, the example we'll follow through the whole week.

1.1

What makes a monopoly

A is a market served by a single seller of a good with no close substitutes, protected by an entry barrier that keeps other firms out. Each of the three assumptions is crucial, and it helps to see what goes wrong when one of them is missing.

Suppose there's only one seller, but buyers have a close substitute. Say the only bakery in a small town is the only place to buy bread. But the supermarket down the road sells tortillas, and many customers see tortillas as a substitute for bread. Then the bakery can't raise its bread price much before customers switch. Being the only seller of a good isn't enough. The firm needs to be the only seller of something buyers can't easily replace.

Now suppose there's one seller and no close substitute, but nothing stops others from entering. Then the situation is temporary. In Week 3, Auto Eco's profit of $24 million a month attracted new firms, and they kept coming until the profit was gone. A monopolist earning a profit faces the same pressure. It stays a monopolist only as long as something stops that entry from happening. We called this an entry barrier in Week 3.

So a monopoly needs all three assumptions at once.

1.2

Where barriers come from

Barriers come in three broad kinds. Naming the kind tells you how long the position is likely to last, and that's usually the first thing a manager or an investor wants to know.

Legal barriers. Patents, copyright, licenses and exclusive contracts all give one firm the legal right to sell and forbid others. A drug company with a patent on a new medicine is the standard example. The state creates these barriers and the state can remove them. A patent expires after a fixed term, and a license can be withdrawn or issued to a rival. So legal barriers can be very strong, but they last only as long as the law protects them.

Structural barriers. Sometimes the barrier comes from the economics of the industry itself. One firm may control a scarce input, such as the only quarry with a particular stone. Or the cost structure may make one firm cheaper than two. A water network, an electricity grid or a railway costs a great deal to build once and very little to run for one more customer. Building a second network beside the first would double the large cost and split the same customers. When one firm has an overwhelming cost advantage over competitors, we call it a . Structural barriers last as long as the cost advantage lasts.

Strategic barriers. An incumbent can also behave in ways that make entry unattractive, for example by building more capacity than it needs so that an entrant expects a price war. Whether a threat like that works depends on whether the entrant believes it. That's a question about strategy, and it needs the game theory of Weeks 6 to 8. We come back to it in Week 8.

The table at the end of Week 3 asked where persistent profit comes from. Every row of that table, from scarce land to patents, is also a source of market power. The difference this week is that the barrier protects a single firm rather than a group of price-taking firms.

1.3

Market power is a matter of degree

Very few firms are literal monopolies. Many more have some : they can raise their price and lose some customers rather than all of them. That's all this week's model needs.

Apple is a useful example. It isn't the only maker of phones, and Samsung, Google and others sell close alternatives. Yet when Apple raises the price of an iPhone a little, demand doesn't collapse. Many customers have bought apps, stored years of photos and messages, and learned how the system works. Switching to another phone would cost them time and money, and some of what they've built up would be lost. Those switching costs, together with the features that set the iPhone apart from other phones, give Apple a downward-sloping demand curve of its own, even in a market with strong rivals.

So the monopoly model applies to any firm whose own demand slopes down. What matters is not the firm's share of some broadly defined market. What matters is how easily its customers can find a substitute when its price rises.

1.4

Price and quantity become one decision

Recall how Week 2 described a price-taker. Auto Eco could sell as many vehicles as it wanted at the market price, and none at all above it. Its demand curve, the demand for its own output, was a horizontal line at the market price. So its only decision was how much to produce.

A monopolist faces the whole market demand curve instead. It chooses a point on that curve, a pair of price and quantity, to maximize its profit. Choosing a price and choosing a quantity are the same thing. If the monopolist sets the price, the demand curve tells it how many units it sells. If it sets the quantity, the demand curve tells it the price at which those units sell. So for a monopolist, price and quantity are one decision.

Our main example this week is Ride On. Ride On operates the coin-operated children's rides in a shopping mall. Inside the mall it has no competitor. Its daily demand is

Ride On demand\(Q^d(p)=140-40p\)

where \(Q\) is the number of rides per day and \(p\) is the price of a ride in dollars. At a price of $3, children take \(140-120=20\) rides a day. At $2, they take 60. At $1, they take 100. Ride On can choose any of these combinations. What it can't do is sell 60 rides at $3, because at $3 only 20 children want a ride.

Since the monopolist's output is the whole market's output, we write it with a capital \(Q\), as we did for market quantities in Weeks 2 and 3. We'll describe Ride On's choice in terms of quantity: how many rides to sell. That makes the comparison with Auto Eco easy, because Auto Eco also chose a quantity. Nothing depends on this choice. Choosing 60 rides and choosing a price of $2 are the same decision.

1.5

Ride On's cost and inverse demand

Ride On's daily economic cost is

Ride On cost\(C(Q)=40+0.5Q\)

The 40 is the daily rental Ride On pays the mall for its space. The 0.5 is the cost of one more ride: electricity and the wear on the machines. Ride On can end the rental if it closes the rides, so the whole of \(C(Q)\) is avoidable, as in our cost functions from Week 1. Marginal cost is constant at 50 cents a ride.

The demand function answers the question: at this price, how many rides do children want? A monopolist choosing a quantity needs the reverse. If I want to sell this many rides, what's the highest price I can charge? Writing price in terms of quantity demanded answers this question. It's called the function, \(p(Q)\). For Ride On, solve the demand equation for \(p\):

\(Q^d\)\(=\)\(140-40p\)Demand.\(40p\)\(=\)\(140-Q\)Add \(40p\) and subtract \(Q\) on both sides.\(p(Q)\)\(=\)\(3.5-\dfrac{Q}{40}\)Divide both sides by 40.

You can read it as a price list. To sell 60 rides a day, Ride On can charge \(p(60)=3.5-60/40=2\) dollars. To sell 100, it has to drop to \(p(100)=1\) dollar. At $3.50 no child rides at all.

There's a second way to read the same function, and it connects back to Week 1. Market demand adds up individual buyers, as we saw in Week 2. Assume each child takes at most one ride. Line the children up from the highest willingness to pay to the lowest. Then \(p(Q)\) is the WTP of the \(Q\)th child in line. The 60th child values a ride at exactly $2. Every child ahead of them values it at more, and every child behind them at less. That's why the price must fall to sell more: the next customer always values a ride a little less than the last one.

For any linear demand \(Q^d(p)=a-bp\) with \(a,b>0\), the same steps give

Linear inverse demand\(p(Q)=\dfrac{a}{b}-\dfrac{Q}{b}\)

The intercept \(a/b\) is the price at which demand falls to zero. The slope \(-1/b\) is how much the price must fall to sell one more unit.

1.6

What the monopoly model does and doesn't claim

The model says that a firm with market power chooses a point on its demand curve to maximize its profit. It can set any price it likes, but then demand decides how many units it sells. It doesn't claim that a monopolist can charge whatever it likes. Ride On could post a price of $10 tomorrow, but no child would ride.

It also doesn't claim that monopolists are large, or that they behave badly. A single ride operator in one mall and a pharmaceutical company with a blockbuster patent face the same pricing problem with very different market conditions.

The model does make two assumptions that we'll keep this week and relax later. First, the firm charges one market price. Ride On charges one price per ride, whoever is riding. In Week 5 we ask what a firm can do when it can charge different buyers different prices. Second, the firm knows its demand curve. In practice firms estimate demand from market data. Throughout the course, when a problem gives you a demand function, you can take it as the result of that kind of careful estimation.

Summary

A monopoly needs one seller, no close substitutes and a barrier to entry, which can be legal, structural or strategic. Market power is a matter of degree: any firm with a demand for its product can adjust its price without losing every customer. Such a firm chooses a point on its demand curve, a pair of price and quantity, so price and quantity are a single decision. Inverse demand \(p(Q)\) gives the price at which \(Q\) units sell, which is also the WTP of the \(Q\)th buyer.

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