Read 5 of 5
When competitive profit persists
What prevents entry from competing profit away?
In the Auto Eco market, positive profit attracted identical new firms, and they kept coming until the profit was gone. So if we see a market where economic profit lasts, some part of that argument must have broken down.
The part that breaks down doesn’t have to be price-taking. A firm can be far too small to affect the price and still have something newcomers can’t get: a scarce resource, a license or a cheaper technology that rivals can’t copy. Each firm still takes the price as given, just as in any competitive market. What’s restricted is who gets to produce.
The Portakal example in this reading shows the difference clearly. Every farm grows the same oranges, and every farm takes the price as given. What’s scarce is the right to farm on the island.
5.1
The Portakal market
On the remote island of Portakal, local demand for oranges is
where quantity is in tonnes and price is in dollars per tonne.
Each island farm has the same economic cost function. The subscript \(i\) stands for “island”:
Dividing total cost by output gives average cost, and the cost of growing one more tonne gives marginal cost:
As we saw in Reading 4, average cost is lowest where it equals marginal cost. Setting the two equal:
At 10 tonnes, average cost is \(10+1+10=21\). So $21 a tonne is the lowest average cost an island farm can reach. It’s also the farm’s shutdown threshold: below $21 a tonne, a farm grows nothing.
Land and local regulation allow at most fifty farms on the island, and each of them is a price-taker. The cap changes who is allowed to produce. It doesn’t change how a farm that is producing decides how much to grow: it still sets price equal to marginal cost.
5.2
What free entry would require
Start by asking what would happen without the cap. If any number of identical island farms could enter, the reasoning from Reading 4 applies. Farms would keep entering until the price fell to the lowest average cost, $21 a tonne, with each farm growing 10 tonnes. At that price, buyers want
tonnes. Supplying 1,000 tonnes at 10 tonnes per farm would take 100 farms. But Portakal allows only fifty. The free-entry outcome can’t happen, so the cap actually limits the market.
This comparison is worth doing first. It tells us whether the cap matters before we work out what happens with it. Suppose demand at $21 had been only 400 tonnes. Then forty farms would have been enough, and a cap of fifty would have made no difference at all.
5.3
Equilibrium with the fifty-farm cap
Now put the cap back. At any price above $21, each island farm grows the amount at which price equals marginal cost:
With all fifty farms growing, market supply is fifty times that:
Set supply equal to demand and solve for the price:
The price of $25 a tonne is above the $21 shutdown threshold, so every farm does grow. The market clears at 600 tonnes. Compared with free entry, the cap means a higher price ($25 instead of $21) and much less fruit (600 tonnes instead of 1,000).
Each farm grows \((25-1)/2=12\) tonnes. Its economic profit is
Every farm is choosing its best output, and the market clears. Yet each farm earns a profit of $44. That profit lasts because the one thing that would compete it away, a fifty-first low-cost farm, isn’t allowed in.
5.4
Opening the market to mainland farms
Now allow farmers on the mainland to ship oranges to Portakal. They use the same farming methods as the island farms, but shipping costs them $2 for every tonne. So their cost function, with the subscript \(m\) for “mainland,” is
The only difference from an island farm is the $2 added to every tonne. That raises both average cost and marginal cost by $2 at every output, just as the battery cost in Reading 3 added $20,000 to every vehicle. The lowest point of average cost stays at 10 tonnes, but it’s now $23 instead of $21:
There are many mainland farmers who could enter, and nothing stops them. So the reasoning from Reading 4 applies to them. They keep entering as long as the price is above $23, which is the lowest average cost they can reach. Entry therefore holds the market price at $23 a tonne. At that price, buyers want
tonnes.
Who supplies those 800 tonnes? The island farms come first. The price of $23 is above their $21 threshold, so all fifty keep growing. Each sets \(23=1+2q\), so each grows 11 tonnes, and together they supply 550. Mainland farms supply the rest. Each mainland farm grows 10 tonnes, at its lowest average cost, so the number of mainland farms is
5.5
The marginal technology earns zero; the low-cost farms don't
A mainland farm earns zero economic profit at $23, because $23 is its lowest average cost. An island farm does better:
Opening the market has cut each island farm’s profit from $44 to $21, but it hasn’t eliminated it. Mainland entry can push the price down only to $23. Below that, mainland farms would make losses and leave. So the island farms keep their $2 cost advantage on every tonne, and that advantage is where their profit comes from.
Economists call this kind of profit a : a return that comes from controlling something scarce, here low-cost access to farmland on the island, rather than from farming any better than anyone else.
That changes how we should measure the island farms’ profit. If the right to farm on the island can be leased, a farmer would pay up to $21 a period to lease it, because that’s what it earns. If the right can be sold, its price should reflect what all those future earnings are worth today. Either way, the right has a market value, and that value is an opportunity cost for whoever holds it, since they could lease it out or sell it instead of farming. Count that cost, and an island farm’s economic profit is zero too, whether the farmer bought the right last week or has owned it for generations. The $21 hasn’t disappeared. It’s the return to owning the right, and it goes to whoever owns it.
5.6
What persistent profit tells a manager
When firms in a price-taking industry keep earning a profit, that’s not a puzzle. It’s a clue. It tells you that one of the assumptions behind the zero-profit result has stopped holding, and it points you toward which one.
| Possible source | Question to ask |
|---|---|
| Scarce land or natural resource | Can another firm obtain an equally productive site? |
| Licence or regulation | Who is legally allowed to enter, and can the rule change? |
| Patent or proprietary technology | How long does the protection last, and can rivals invent around it? |
| Capacity, finance or distribution access | Is the constraint temporary or structural? |
| Lower opportunity cost | Can entrants copy the cost advantage, or is it tied to a scarce resource? |
How long the profit lasts depends on how long the barrier or cost advantage lasts. A regulation can be repealed. A patent expires. A scarce location can’t be copied, but as 5.5 showed, its value ends up in the price of the land or the right, so whoever owns it collects the profit.
This way of thinking also prepares us for monopoly. In Week 3, every firm takes the market price as given. In Week 4, we study a firm that produces enough of the market’s output to change the price it receives.
Summary