Week 8: Practice

Capacity as a Strategic Barrier

Demand in an industry is \(p=900-q_1-q_2\), where \(q_1\) and \(q_2\) are the outputs of Firm 1 and Firm 2. To produce, a firm must build a plant, and there are two kinds. A small plant costs $50,000 a year and can produce up to 100 units. A large plant costs $175,000 a year and can produce up to 700 units. Either way, there's no further cost of production.

Question 1

The firms choose their plants and outputs at the same time. Find the Nash equilibrium, the price and the profits.

Reveal the solution

Find the output game for each pair of plants, then compare. Without capacity limits, Firm 1's marginal revenue is \(900-2q_1-q_2\), so its best response is \(q_1=450-\frac{q_2}{2}\), and the same for Firm 2.

  • Both large: the capacity of 700 doesn't bind, so each produces the Cournot output of 300. The price is 300 and each earns \(90{,}000-175{,}000=-85{,}000\).
  • Firm 1 large, Firm 2 small: Firm 2 would like to produce more than 100 but can't, so it produces 100. Firm 1's best response is \(450-50=400\). The price is 400. Firm 1 earns \(160{,}000-175{,}000=-15{,}000\) and Firm 2 earns \(40{,}000-50{,}000=-10{,}000\).
  • Both small: each produces at capacity, 100. The price is 700, and each earns \(70{,}000-50{,}000=20{,}000\).
Profits in thousands of dollars.

Small is a dominant strategy for both firms. In the Nash equilibrium each builds a small plant and produces 100, the price is 700 and each earns 20,000.

Question 2

Now Firm 1 builds its plant first. Firm 2 sees it and decides whether to enter, and with which plant. Then the firms choose outputs at the same time. Find the credible Nash equilibrium. Does the threat of entry change Firm 1's choice?

Reveal the solution

Two outcomes are new: Firm 2 stays out. With a large plant, Firm 1 is a monopolist without a binding capacity limit: \(900-2q_1=0\) gives 450 units at a price of 450, and a profit of \(202{,}500-175{,}000=27{,}500\). With a small plant, it produces 100 at a price of 800 and earns \(80{,}000-50{,}000=30{,}000\).

Profits in thousands of dollars, Firm 1's first. Click a branch at every decision node to solve it from the end.

After a small plant, Firm 2 compares 20 (small), −15 (large) and 0 (out), and enters with a small plant, leaving Firm 1 with 20. After a large plant, every entry loses money, so Firm 2 stays out and Firm 1 earns 27.5. Firm 1 builds the large plant.

In the credible Nash equilibrium, Firm 1 builds large and produces 450, and Firm 2 stays out. Without a potential entrant, Firm 1 would build small and earn 30,000. The large plant is excess capacity built only to deter entry: if Firm 2 came in, Firm 1's large plant would make producing 400 its best response, and Firm 2 would lose money.

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