Week 8: Practice

Wage Bargaining and Skill Development

Chloé, an MBA graduate, is interning at Nous Group. At the end of the internship Nous makes her a permanent offer, \(w_n\). If she accepts, the game ends. If she rejects it, she goes to the job market, where BCG and McKinsey make offers \(w_b\) and \(w_m\) at the same time. She can accept either one or neither.

Chloé generates revenue of 100 at Nous but only 50 at BCG or McKinsey. A firm's payoff is the revenue she generates minus her wage if she joins it, and zero otherwise. Chloé's payoff is the wage she accepts, or zero. If she's indifferent between accepting and rejecting, she accepts; if BCG and McKinsey offer the same wage, she picks one with a coin flip.

Question 1

Suppose Chloé rejects Nous and goes to the market. What do BCG and McKinsey offer?

Reveal the solution

This is Bertrand competition from Week 7, with wages instead of prices. Each firm values Chloé at 50. If one firm offers less than 50, the other can offer a little more and still profit, so offers rise. Neither will offer more than 50. In the only equilibrium both offer 50, and Chloé earns 50.

Question 2

Find the credible Nash equilibrium of the whole game.

Reveal the solution

Solve backward. In the market Chloé gets 50, so she accepts Nous's offer if \(w_n\geq50\). Nous offers exactly 50, she accepts, and Nous keeps \(100-50=50\). Chloé's wage is set by her outside option, not by what she's worth at Nous.

Question 3

Before the internship ends, Chloé can take one course at a cost of 10. Corporate Strategy raises her revenue at Nous to 150 and leaves it at 50 elsewhere. Game Theory raises it to 125 at Nous and 75 at BCG and McKinsey. The firms see her choice. Does she take a course, and which one?

Reveal the solution
  • No course: wage 50, payoff 50.
  • Corporate Strategy: her outside offers are still 50, so Nous offers 50. Her payoff is \(50-10=40\). Nous captures the whole gain: it's a firm-specific skill, and Nous holds it up.
  • Game Theory: BCG and McKinsey now bid up to 75, so Nous must offer 75. Her payoff is \(75-10=65\).

Chloé takes Game Theory, even though Corporate Strategy creates more value at Nous (150 against 125). She invests in the general skill because only the general skill raises her outside option. This is hold-up: the specific investment's return goes to the other side.

Question 4

Now Chloé proposes a wage to Nous instead. If Nous accepts, she joins; if not, she goes to the market as before. Does your answer to Question 3 change?

Reveal the solution

Yes. Nous accepts any wage up to her revenue at Nous, because rejecting leaves it with nothing. So Chloé asks for her full revenue at Nous: 100 with no course, \(150-10=140\) with Corporate Strategy and \(125-10=115\) with Game Theory. She takes Corporate Strategy.

Giving the bargaining power to the party making the specific investment removes the hold-up, and the more valuable investment gets made. That's one of the remedies in Reading 5.

Concept atlas