Week 7: Practice

Hardware and Software

Two goods are perfect complements when they are only useful together, in fixed proportions: left and right shoes, printers and ink, a console and its operating system. Here two separate firms make them. Firm H makes the hardware and Firm S the software. A customer buys one of each or neither, so the effective price is \(p_H+p_S\), and demand for each is

\(q_H=q_S\)\(=\)\(50-(p_H+p_S)\)

Neither firm has production costs. The firms set their prices at the same time.

Question 1

Find each firm's best-response function and the Nash equilibrium prices.

Reveal the solution

Firm H's profit is \(p_H\,[50-(p_H+p_S)]\). Raising \(p_H\) by a dollar gains a dollar on every unit sold and loses one unit, so the best price makes \(50-p_H-p_S=p_H\):

\(p_H\)\(=\)\(\dfrac{50-p_S}{2}\)\(p_S\)\(=\)\(\dfrac{50-p_H}{2}\)By symmetry.

These best responses slope down: when one firm raises its price, the other's best price falls, because the bundle is now more expensive and fewer customers buy. In a symmetric equilibrium \(p=\frac{50-p}{2}\), so \(p_H=p_S=\frac{50}{3}\). Customers pay \(\frac{100}{3}\) for the pair and buy \(\frac{50}{3}\) of them. Each firm earns \(\left(\frac{50}{3}\right)^2=\frac{2500}{9}\).

Question 2

If the two firms merged and set both prices together, what would they charge? As a regulator who cares about total welfare, would you allow the merger? Would your answer be the same if the goods were substitutes?

Reveal the solution

The merged firm chooses the price of the pair, \(P=p_H+p_S\), facing demand \(50-P\). Revenue \(P(50-P)\) is largest at \(P=25\), so it charges 12.50 for each good. Customers pay 25 for the pair instead of \(33\tfrac{1}{3}\), buy 25 pairs instead of \(16\tfrac{2}{3}\), and the merged firm earns 625, more than the \(\frac{5000}{9}\) the two firms earned together.

Everybody gains, so a regulator should allow it. Each separate firm ignores that its high price reduces the other's sales. With complements that externality pushes prices too high, and merging removes it.

With substitutes the externality runs the other way. Each firm's price cut takes sales from its rival, which it ignores, so separate firms price too low from the industry's point of view. A merger or cartel removes that and raises prices, as the cafés with regulars showed: $8 together against $6 apart. That merger would hurt customers.

Concept atlas