The merged firm chooses the price of the pair, \(P=p_H+p_S\), facing demand \(50-P\). Revenue \(P(50-P)\) is largest at \(P=25\), so it charges 12.50 for each good. Customers pay 25 for the pair instead of \(33\tfrac{1}{3}\), buy 25 pairs instead of \(16\tfrac{2}{3}\), and the merged firm earns 625, more than the \(\frac{5000}{9}\) the two firms earned together.
Everybody gains, so a regulator should allow it. Each separate firm ignores that its high price reduces the other's sales. With complements that externality pushes prices too high, and merging removes it.
With substitutes the externality runs the other way. Each firm's price cut takes sales from its rival, which it ignores, so separate firms price too low from the industry's point of view. A merger or cartel removes that and raises prices, as the cafés with regulars showed: $8 together against $6 apart. That merger would hurt customers.