Week 7: Practice

The Size of a Cartel

\(n\) firms sell an identical product. Each period they set prices at the same time. Customers buy only from the firms with the lowest price, which share the sales equally, and total demand is \(Q=100-p\) at that price. Each firm's cost is 20 a unit. The game is repeated forever, and each firm has discount factor \(\delta\).

The firms would like to hold the monopoly price, \(p^m=60\), every period.

Question 1

What strategies could sustain the monopoly price in equilibrium?

Reveal the solution

Grim trigger: charge 60 as long as every firm has always charged 60; after any period in which some firm charged less, charge 20, marginal cost, forever.

The punishment is credible. When every firm charges 20, no firm can gain by changing its price: this is the Bertrand equilibrium of the one-period game.

Question 2

Find the condition on \(\delta\) and \(n\) under which the cartel holds. What does it imply about the size of a cartel?

Reveal the solution

At the monopoly price, 40 units sell at a margin of 40, so industry profit is 1,600 a period and each firm earns \(\frac{1600}{n}\).

A firm that undercuts slightly takes the whole market for one period, earning almost 1,600, and then earns nothing forever after. The cartel holds if

\(\dfrac{1600}{n}\cdot\dfrac{1}{1-\delta}\)\(\geq\)\(1600\)\(1\)\(\geq\)\(n(1-\delta)\)\(\delta\)\(\geq\)\(1-\dfrac{1}{n}\)

Two firms need \(\delta\geq\frac{1}{2}\), five need \(\frac{4}{5}\), ten need \(\frac{9}{10}\). Each extra member shrinks every member's share of the cartel profit, but not the one-period gain from cheating, which is always the whole market. Large cartels need very patient members, which is one reason most cartels that are caught have only a handful of members.

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