Read 4 of 5
Sequential games
How should you move when others will observe your choice and respond?
In many business decisions, one party moves and the others react. A launch, a price change or an entry decision is public, and the rivals respond to what they see.
This reading draws such games as trees and shows that a later mover's strategy is a whole plan. That makes room for threats, and we'll see that some threats support a Nash equilibrium even though nobody would carry them out. Backward induction removes them.
4.1
The catwalk game
Spring is coming. Allure Avenue, a prominent US fashion house, is choosing between a Sporty line (S) and a Classical line (C). Its choice will be public. DownUnder Style, an Australian brand breaking into the US market, will see Allure's choice and then introduce either its European line (E) or its Outback collection (O).
A like this is represented as a game tree. Each decision node belongs to one player, each branch is an action, and each node at the end of the tree is an outcome with its payoffs, the first mover's first.
There are four possible outcomes. Allure gets 6 and DownUnder 4 after (S, E); 3 and 3 after (S, O); 2 and 2 after (C, E); and 4 and 6 after (C, O).
4.2
A strategy is a plan
In a simultaneous game, a strategy is just an action. In a sequential game, a strategy is a complete plan: it says what the player will do at every point where it might have to move, including points that the game may never reach.
Allure moves once and has two strategies, S and C. DownUnder moves after seeing Allure's choice, so its strategy has to say what it does after S and what it does after C. That gives four strategies. We write them as two letters: the first is DownUnder's line after S and the second its line after C.
| DownUnder's strategy | After S | After C |
|---|---|---|
| EE | European | European |
| EO | European | Outback |
| OE | Outback | European |
| OO | Outback | Outback |
With strategies defined this way, we can write the sequential game as a matrix and look for its Nash equilibria with the tools of Reading 3:
The matrix has three Nash equilibria: (S, EE), (S, EO) and (C, OO). In each of them, neither firm can do better by changing its plan, given the other's plan.
4.3
A threat that isn't credible
Look at (C, OO). DownUnder's plan says: "Outback, whatever you launch." If Allure believes it, Allure compares 3 from Sporty with 4 from Classical and launches Classical. Given Classical, Outback is DownUnder's best reply, earning 6. Both are best responses, so (C, OO) is a Nash equilibrium, and a good one for DownUnder.
But think about what would happen if Allure launched Sporty anyway. DownUnder would then be choosing between European, worth 4, and Outback, worth 3. It would launch European. The plan "Outback whatever you launch" is a threat DownUnder wouldn't carry out once the moment came. Allure, which can work this out, shouldn't believe it.
A is one that the player making it would actually want to carry out if the moment came. DownUnder's threat isn't credible, and an equilibrium that depends on it isn't a sensible prediction.
The equilibrium (S, EE) has a similar flaw, in a place that never gets reached. It plans European after Classical, where Outback would earn DownUnder 6 rather than 2. Allure launches Sporty, so the plan is never tested, but it isn't a plan DownUnder would follow.
The Nash equilibrium checks only that each strategy is a best response to the other strategy as a whole. It doesn't check whether each part of the plan makes sense at the moment it would be used. For sequential games we need a stricter test.
4.4
Backward induction
The stricter test is to require that every player's strategy be a best response at every decision point, including those that aren't reached. We find such strategies by : start at the end of the tree and work back to the beginning.
- Start with the last moves. These are DownUnder's. After Sporty, European gives DownUnder 4 and Outback 3, so it chooses European. After Classical, European gives 2 and Outback 6, so it chooses Outback.
- Replace each last move with its outcome. Sporty now leads to (6, 4) and Classical to (4, 6).
- Move back one step. Allure anticipates DownUnder's replies. Sporty gives Allure 6 and Classical 4, so Allure launches Sporty.
The result is that Allure plays S and DownUnder plays EO, European after Sporty and Outback after Classical. This is the of the game. Allure launches Sporty, DownUnder answers with European, and the payoffs are 6 and 4.
Of the three Nash equilibria, only (S, EO) survives. It's the only one in which DownUnder's plan is optimal at both of its decision points. A credible Nash equilibrium is always a Nash equilibrium, but not every Nash equilibrium is credible.
Notice who does well here. Moving first lets Allure pick the branch, knowing how DownUnder will answer, and it gets 6. Under the non-credible equilibrium it would have got 4. That isn't true of every game, though. If matching pennies were played in sequence, the player who sees the other's coin first would always win, so there the second mover has the advantage.
Is the threat credible?
An incumbent tells a potential entrant: "If you enter, we'll start a price war." After entry, a price war earns the incumbent 2 and sharing the market earns it 5. Is the threat credible?
Backward induction asks what the incumbent would choose once entry has happened: 5 from sharing against 2 from fighting. So it would share, and an entrant who works that out isn't deterred. Reputation could change this, but only by changing the payoffs, for example if the incumbent faces other potential entrants later. Week 8 returns to this game.
Change one number: after entry, a price war earns the incumbent 6 and sharing earns 5. Is the threat credible now?
Now fighting is the incumbent's best reply to entry, 6 against 5, so it would carry out the threat. Whether a threat is credible depends on the payoff from carrying it out, not on how harsh it is.
4.5
Where sequential games show up
Many strategic situations are best described as sequential games:
- Market entry. An entrant has to anticipate how incumbents will react once it's in.
- English auctions. Bidders see the current high bid and decide whether to raise it.
- Labor negotiations. Employers and unions make offers in turn, each responding to the last.
- Product launches. A firm's timing and design depend on what its rivals have launched and on how they'll respond.
In each case, the question for the first mover is the one Allure asked: what will the others do once they see my move? And the question for anyone hearing a threat or a promise is whether the person making it would want to follow through.
4.6
Centipede and ultimatum: what people actually do
Backward induction gives sharp predictions. Two classic games test them.
The centipede game. Two players take turns. At each turn, the player can stop the game and take the payoffs shown, or continue, which passes the move to the other player and makes the total payoff larger. Here is an eight-move version. If both always continue, the game ends with 8 for Player 1 and 6 for Player 2.
Start at the end. At move 8, Player 2 compares 7 from stopping with 6 from continuing, and stops. At move 7, Player 1 knows this: continuing gives 6, stopping gives 7, so Player 1 stops. The same comparison repeats at every move, all the way back to the first. Backward induction predicts that Player 1 stops immediately, taking 1 and leaving Player 2 with 0, although both could have had far more.
The ultimatum game. A proposer has $100 and offers the responder a share of it. The proposer keeps \(x\) and offers \(100-x\). The responder accepts or rejects. If the responder accepts, both get their shares. If the responder rejects, both get nothing.
Backward induction is quick. A responder who cares only about money accepts any positive offer, because something beats nothing. Knowing that, the proposer offers the smallest positive amount. The credible Nash equilibrium is a tiny offer, accepted.
In experiments, people don't play either game this way. Many players continue in the centipede game for several moves. In the ultimatum game, responders often reject offers they see as unfair, even though rejecting costs them money, and proposers, anticipating this, offer much more than the minimum.
That doesn't mean the logic of backward induction is wrong. It means the payoffs were. Reading 1 said a payoff can include anything a player cares about. A responder who would rather walk away than accept $1 out of $100 has a payoff that includes fairness, and with those payoffs backward induction predicts a larger offer. The ultimatum game is also a stark version of the bargaining you saw in Week 1, where one side makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer.
Summary