Week 06 ·

Thinking strategically

How should I act and strategize when outcomes depend on others who also strategize?

So far we have studied two kinds of firm. A monopoly is the only seller in its market, so it sets its price or quantity knowing that no rival will react. A competitive firm is one of many sellers, each too small to move the market price, so it takes the price as given and chooses only how much to produce. In both cases a rival's choice didn't matter. Now it does, and the rival is thinking about us. We describe these situations as games, look for strategies that are best whatever the rival does, find Nash equilibria, solve games played in sequence by backward induction and ask when the threat of future punishment keeps rivals cooperating.

Week 6 materials

01ReadFive sections of lecture notes.5 sections02ClassSlide deck.2 sessions03ExploreBest responses, iterated elimination, backward induction and repeated play.4 interactive games04PracticePricing games, equilibria, credibility and backward induction.5 activities05ReviewReview the week's material and concepts.10 checks

By the end

What you should be able to do

  1. Represent a strategic situation as a game: players, strategies, payoffs and timing, as a payoff matrix or a game tree.
  2. Identify dominant and dominated strategies, and solve a game by iterated elimination of dominated strategies.
  3. Find pure-strategy Nash equilibria from best responses, and explain what multiple equilibria, or none, mean for prediction.
  4. Solve a sequential game by backward induction, and explain why a Nash equilibrium can rest on a threat that isn't credible.
  5. Use the discount factor to find when the threat of future punishment sustains cooperation in a repeated prisoner's dilemma.

Concept atlas