Les épinards can charge a different price in each market, so this is third-degree price discrimination. Inverse demands are \(p_M=200-q_M\) and \(p_I=50-q_I/2\), so
Marginal revenues\(MR_M(q_M)\)\(=\)\(200-2q_M\)\(MR_I(q_I)\)\(=\)\(50-q_I\)
Try to serve both markets. Each marginal revenue must equal marginal cost, \(q_M+q_I\):
Mainland\(200-2q_M\)\(=\)\(q_M+q_I\)\(200\)\(=\)\(3q_M+q_I\)
Island\(50-q_I\)\(=\)\(q_M+q_I\)\(50\)\(=\)\(q_M+2q_I\)
From the island equation, \(q_M=50-2q_I\). Substitute into the mainland equation:
Solve\(200\)\(=\)\(3(50-2q_I)+q_I\)\(=\)\(150-5q_I\)\(q_I\)\(=\)\(-10\)
A negative quantity means the island shouldn't be served at all. So Les épinards sells only on the mainland, where \(MR_M=MC\):
Mainland only\(200-2q_M\)\(=\)\(q_M\)\(q_M\)\(=\)\(\dfrac{200}{3}\approx66.67\)
Check the island at this output. Marginal cost is \(200/3\approx66.67\), and the first unit sold on the island would add at most \(MR_I(0)=50\). The island's highest marginal revenue is below marginal cost, so selling there would lower profit. Les épinards supplies about 66.67 units to the mainland and none to the island.