Question 1
Under the patent, the firm sells to two separated markets and is the only seller in both. This is third-degree price discrimination. Allocate output so that the two marginal revenues are equal, then set the common marginal revenue equal to marginal cost.
Both inverse demands are linear, so each marginal revenue has the same intercept and twice the slope:
Brand\(R_B(q_B)\)\(=\)\((10{,}000-1.5q_B)q_B\)\(MR_B(q_B)\)\(=\)\(10{,}000-3q_B\)
Generic\(R_G(q_G)\)\(=\)\((6{,}000-4.5q_G)q_G\)\(MR_G(q_G)\)\(=\)\(6{,}000-9q_G\)
Allocation. Equal marginal revenues give
Allocation rule\(10{,}000-3q_B\)\(=\)\(6{,}000-9q_G\)\(3q_B-9q_G\)\(=\)\(4{,}000\)
Total output. The brand's marginal revenue must also equal marginal cost, \(MC(Q)=0.25(q_B+q_G)\):
Output rule\(10{,}000-3q_B\)\(=\)\(0.25(q_B+q_G)\)\(40{,}000-12q_B\)\(=\)\(q_B+q_G\)\(q_G\)\(=\)\(40{,}000-13q_B\)
Substitute the output rule into the allocation rule:
Solve\(3q_B-9(40{,}000-13q_B)\)\(=\)\(4{,}000\)\(120q_B\)\(=\)\(364{,}000\)\(q_B\)\(=\)\(\dfrac{9{,}100}{3}\approx3{,}033.33\)\(q_G\)\(=\)\(40{,}000-13\times\dfrac{9{,}100}{3}=\dfrac{1{,}700}{3}\approx566.67\)
Total output is 3,600. Check: \(MR_B=10{,}000-9{,}100=900\), \(MR_G=6{,}000-5{,}100=900\) and \(MC(3{,}600)=900\). Prices come from each market's demand:
Prices\(p_B\)\(=\)\(10{,}000-1.5\times\dfrac{9{,}100}{3}=5{,}450\)\(p_G\)\(=\)\(6{,}000-4.5\times\dfrac{1{,}700}{3}=3{,}450\)
With \(MC(Q)=0.25Q\) and no fixed cost, cost is \(C(Q)=0.125Q^2\). Profit is
Profit under the patent\(\pi_1\)\(=\)\(5{,}450\times\dfrac{9{,}100}{3}+3{,}450\times\dfrac{1{,}700}{3}-0.125\times3{,}600^2\)\(=\)\(18{,}486{,}667-1{,}620{,}000\)\(\approx\)\(16{,}866{,}667\)
Question 2
After entry the generic market is close to perfectly competitive. The firm can sell as much generic Cigarex as it likes at $850, so selling one more generic unit adds exactly $850 to revenue: \(MR_G=850\). Generic Cigarex is now the firm's outside option, and the brand market's marginal revenue must match it:
Brand allocation\(10{,}000-3q_B\)\(=\)\(850\)\(q_B\)\(=\)\(3{,}050\)\(p_B\)\(=\)\(10{,}000-1.5\times3{,}050=5{,}425\)
Total output is where marginal cost reaches the same $850:
Total output\(0.25Q\)\(=\)\(850\)\(Q\)\(=\)\(3{,}400\)\(q_G\)\(=\)\(3{,}400-3{,}050=350\)
Yes, the firm should keep producing for the generic market. At 3,050 units, marginal cost is only $762.50, below the $850 a generic unit brings in. It sells 3,050 units of the brand at $5,425 and 350 units of the generic at $850.
Profit at a generic price of 850\(\pi_2\)\(=\)\(5{,}425\times3{,}050+850\times350-0.125\times3{,}400^2\)\(=\)\(16{,}843{,}750-1{,}445{,}000\)\(=\)\(15{,}398{,}750\)
For comparison, serving only the brand market means \(10{,}000-3q_B=0.25q_B\), so \(q_B\approx3{,}077\) at about $5,385, with profit of about $15,384,615. The generic sales add about $14,000.
The brand price falls from $5,450 to $5,425. Generic sales are now less valuable at the margin than before, so the firm moves a few units into the brand market, which means a slightly lower brand price.
Question 3
With a competitive generic price of $900, \(MR_G=900\):
Brand allocation\(10{,}000-3q_B\)\(=\)\(900\)\(q_B\)\(=\)\(\dfrac{9{,}100}{3}\approx3{,}033.33\)\(p_B\)\(=\)\(5{,}450\)
Total output\(0.25Q\)\(=\)\(900\)\(Q\)\(=\)\(3{,}600\)\(q_G\)\(=\)\(3{,}600-\dfrac{9{,}100}{3}\approx566.67\)
Profit at a generic price of 900\(\pi_3\)\(=\)\(5{,}450\times\dfrac{9{,}100}{3}+900\times\dfrac{1{,}700}{3}-0.125\times3{,}600^2\)\(=\)\(17{,}041{,}667-1{,}620{,}000\)\(\approx\)\(15{,}421{,}667\)
Total production, the brand quantity, the brand price and the firm's generic quantity are all exactly as in Question 1. Only the generic price differs: $900 instead of $3,450.
How can the firm sell the same generic quantity at a much lower price? Because the allocation depends on marginal revenue, not on price. Under the patent, the firm's 567th generic unit sold for $3,450, but selling it meant cutting the price on all the other generic units, so it added only $900 to revenue. After entry, a generic unit sells for $900 and adds exactly $900, because the firm no longer moves the generic price. Marginal revenue is $900 in both cases, so every quantity decision is the same. The firm earns less, about $15.42 million against $16.87 million, because it no longer collects a monopoly price on its generic units.
The generic market as a whole sells far more than before, because the entrants supply most of it. Generic buyers gain from entry. The firm's own generic sales don't change.