Week 5: Assignment

Cigarex

In the United States, a new drug is protected by a patent for 17 years. When the patent expires, other firms can enter and sell generic versions of the drug. The original firm keeps the rights to the brand name. Tylenol, for example, is a brand name, and acetaminophen is the chemical it contains.

Regulators require generic and brand-name versions to work equally well. Even so, many patients prefer the brand and believe it is better. So the original manufacturer often starts selling its own generic version shortly before its patent expires and serves both markets. The generic is usually made in the same plant, on the same production line, as the brand. Only the label differs.

You are the brand manager of Cigarex, a drug that helps people quit smoking, and its patent is about to expire. Inverse demand for brand-name Cigarex is

Brand\(p_B(q_B)=10{,}000-1.5q_B\)

and inverse demand for generic Cigarex is

Generic\(p_G(q_G)=6{,}000-4.5q_G\)

The patients who buy the brand and those who buy the generic are separate groups. Both versions are made in the same plant, and marginal cost depends on total output \(Q=q_B+q_G\):

Marginal cost\(MC(Q)=0.25Q\)

Question 1

While the patent is still in force, how much Cigarex should you produce in total? How should you split it between the brand and generic markets, and what price should you charge in each?

Question 2

When the patent expires, the large profits attract several manufacturers into the generic market. It becomes nearly perfectly competitive, and the generic price falls to $850. Demand for the brand doesn't change, because patients who prefer the brand keep buying it.

At a generic price of $850, should you still produce for the generic market? If so, how much should you produce for each market, and what is the new brand price? If not, what quantity and price should you choose for the brand?

Question 3

Suppose instead that the competitive generic price is $900. How does your answer to Question 2 change?

Compare this answer with your answer to Question 1. What happens to total production, and to the amount you sell in each market? Does the quantity of generic Cigarex you sell rise or fall compared with Question 1, when the patent was in force? How do you reconcile that with the fact that the generic price is now lower?

Reveal the solution

Solutions: Cigarex

Question 1

Under the patent, the firm sells to two separated markets and is the only seller in both. This is third-degree price discrimination. Allocate output so that the two marginal revenues are equal, then set the common marginal revenue equal to marginal cost.

Both inverse demands are linear, so each marginal revenue has the same intercept and twice the slope:

Brand\(R_B(q_B)\)\(=\)\((10{,}000-1.5q_B)q_B\)\(MR_B(q_B)\)\(=\)\(10{,}000-3q_B\)
Generic\(R_G(q_G)\)\(=\)\((6{,}000-4.5q_G)q_G\)\(MR_G(q_G)\)\(=\)\(6{,}000-9q_G\)

Allocation. Equal marginal revenues give

Allocation rule\(10{,}000-3q_B\)\(=\)\(6{,}000-9q_G\)\(3q_B-9q_G\)\(=\)\(4{,}000\)

Total output. The brand's marginal revenue must also equal marginal cost, \(MC(Q)=0.25(q_B+q_G)\):

Output rule\(10{,}000-3q_B\)\(=\)\(0.25(q_B+q_G)\)\(40{,}000-12q_B\)\(=\)\(q_B+q_G\)\(q_G\)\(=\)\(40{,}000-13q_B\)

Substitute the output rule into the allocation rule:

Solve\(3q_B-9(40{,}000-13q_B)\)\(=\)\(4{,}000\)\(120q_B\)\(=\)\(364{,}000\)\(q_B\)\(=\)\(\dfrac{9{,}100}{3}\approx3{,}033.33\)\(q_G\)\(=\)\(40{,}000-13\times\dfrac{9{,}100}{3}=\dfrac{1{,}700}{3}\approx566.67\)

Total output is 3,600. Check: \(MR_B=10{,}000-9{,}100=900\), \(MR_G=6{,}000-5{,}100=900\) and \(MC(3{,}600)=900\). Prices come from each market's demand:

Prices\(p_B\)\(=\)\(10{,}000-1.5\times\dfrac{9{,}100}{3}=5{,}450\)\(p_G\)\(=\)\(6{,}000-4.5\times\dfrac{1{,}700}{3}=3{,}450\)

With \(MC(Q)=0.25Q\) and no fixed cost, cost is \(C(Q)=0.125Q^2\). Profit is

Profit under the patent\(\pi_1\)\(=\)\(5{,}450\times\dfrac{9{,}100}{3}+3{,}450\times\dfrac{1{,}700}{3}-0.125\times3{,}600^2\)\(=\)\(18{,}486{,}667-1{,}620{,}000\)\(\approx\)\(16{,}866{,}667\)

Question 2

After entry the generic market is close to perfectly competitive. The firm can sell as much generic Cigarex as it likes at $850, so selling one more generic unit adds exactly $850 to revenue: \(MR_G=850\). Generic Cigarex is now the firm's outside option, and the brand market's marginal revenue must match it:

Brand allocation\(10{,}000-3q_B\)\(=\)\(850\)\(q_B\)\(=\)\(3{,}050\)\(p_B\)\(=\)\(10{,}000-1.5\times3{,}050=5{,}425\)

Total output is where marginal cost reaches the same $850:

Total output\(0.25Q\)\(=\)\(850\)\(Q\)\(=\)\(3{,}400\)\(q_G\)\(=\)\(3{,}400-3{,}050=350\)

Yes, the firm should keep producing for the generic market. At 3,050 units, marginal cost is only $762.50, below the $850 a generic unit brings in. It sells 3,050 units of the brand at $5,425 and 350 units of the generic at $850.

Profit at a generic price of 850\(\pi_2\)\(=\)\(5{,}425\times3{,}050+850\times350-0.125\times3{,}400^2\)\(=\)\(16{,}843{,}750-1{,}445{,}000\)\(=\)\(15{,}398{,}750\)

For comparison, serving only the brand market means \(10{,}000-3q_B=0.25q_B\), so \(q_B\approx3{,}077\) at about $5,385, with profit of about $15,384,615. The generic sales add about $14,000.

The brand price falls from $5,450 to $5,425. Generic sales are now less valuable at the margin than before, so the firm moves a few units into the brand market, which means a slightly lower brand price.

Question 3

With a competitive generic price of $900, \(MR_G=900\):

Brand allocation\(10{,}000-3q_B\)\(=\)\(900\)\(q_B\)\(=\)\(\dfrac{9{,}100}{3}\approx3{,}033.33\)\(p_B\)\(=\)\(5{,}450\)
Total output\(0.25Q\)\(=\)\(900\)\(Q\)\(=\)\(3{,}600\)\(q_G\)\(=\)\(3{,}600-\dfrac{9{,}100}{3}\approx566.67\)
Profit at a generic price of 900\(\pi_3\)\(=\)\(5{,}450\times\dfrac{9{,}100}{3}+900\times\dfrac{1{,}700}{3}-0.125\times3{,}600^2\)\(=\)\(17{,}041{,}667-1{,}620{,}000\)\(\approx\)\(15{,}421{,}667\)

Total production, the brand quantity, the brand price and the firm's generic quantity are all exactly as in Question 1. Only the generic price differs: $900 instead of $3,450.

How can the firm sell the same generic quantity at a much lower price? Because the allocation depends on marginal revenue, not on price. Under the patent, the firm's 567th generic unit sold for $3,450, but selling it meant cutting the price on all the other generic units, so it added only $900 to revenue. After entry, a generic unit sells for $900 and adds exactly $900, because the firm no longer moves the generic price. Marginal revenue is $900 in both cases, so every quantity decision is the same. The firm earns less, about $15.42 million against $16.87 million, because it no longer collects a monopoly price on its generic units.

The generic market as a whole sells far more than before, because the entrants supply most of it. Generic buyers gain from entry. The firm's own generic sales don't change.

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