Week 6: Practice

Poor Pedestrian

A pedestrian is struck by a car and lies injured on the road. Two people nearby witness the accident. At the same moment, each must decide whether to call for help.

Each bystander gets a benefit of 10 if a call for help is made, whoever makes it. Making the call costs 3. So a bystander who calls gets \(10-3=7\), a bystander who doesn't call while the other does gets 10, and if nobody calls, each gets 0.

Question 1

Write this situation as a simultaneous game and find its Nash equilibria.

Reveal the solution

If the other bystander calls, your best response is to ignore, 10 against 7. If the other ignores, your best response is to call, 7 against 0. There are two Nash equilibria, (Call, Ignore) and (Ignore, Call). In each, exactly one person calls.

The game has the structure of chicken: each bystander prefers the equilibrium in which the other one calls. The model says that someone calls, but not who.

Question 2

Now suppose everything is the same, except that more than two people witness the accident. How does your answer to Question 1 change?

Reveal the solution

Take any bystander. If at least one other person calls, the help comes anyway, so the best response is to ignore and get 10 rather than 7. If nobody else calls, the best response is to call and get 7 rather than 0.

So in a Nash equilibrium exactly one person calls. If nobody called, any bystander would rather call. If two or more called, each caller would rather not. With \(n\) bystanders there are \(n\) equilibria, one for each person who might be the caller.

As in Question 1, the equilibria don't say who calls, and with more bystanders it's less obvious who it should be. That is why first-aid courses teach you to point at one person and tell them to call.

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