Managerial Economics · Week 6

Thinking strategically

How do we act when outcomes depend on others?

1

What is a decision problem?

Action determines the outcome

One person chooses an action from a set of alternatives to achieve their objective.

2

What is a strategic problem?

Actions determine the outcome

Two or more people, each with their own objective, choose actions. The outcome depends on what everyone chooses.

3

A game

Anatomy of a game

  1. Players: who decides.
  2. Strategies: what each can do.
  3. Outcomes: what each combination of strategies leads to.
  4. Payoffs: what each outcome is worth to each player.
  5. Rules: who moves when, and who sees what.
4

Players' behavior

What does rational mean?

Payoffs capture how a player ranks outcomes. Each player maximizes their payoff given what they know and what they conjecture about the others.

5

Timing

Simultaneous or sequential

Simultaneous

No player sees the others' moves before choosing.

Payoff matrix
Sequential

Later players see earlier moves.

Game tree
6

Timing

Simultaneous or sequential

7

Information

Complete or incomplete

Complete

Every player knows the entire structure of the game.

Incomplete

At least one player is uncertain about the ingredients of the game, such as a rival's payoffs.

8

Two cafés across the street

$4 or $6 a cup?

100 price-sensitive customers a day go to the cheaper café. If the prices are equal, the cafés split the market equally.

If you ran Café A, how would you play?
9

Two cafés

Pricing game

10

Dominant strategy

Higher payoff against every action of the rival

No guessing needed. If you have one, play it.

Dominant strategy. For a player, an action is dominant if it yields at least as high a payoff as any other action, regardless of what the other players do.

11

Two cafés, a variant

Pricing game

12

Dominated strategy

What won't Player 1 play?

13

Dominated strategy

Another strategy does better against every action of the rival

A rational player never plays a dominated strategy, so we can delete it.

Dominated strategy. For a player, an action is dominated if another action yields a higher payoff, regardless of what the other players do.

14

Iterated elimination

Eliminating dominated strategies

15

Prisoners' dilemma

$4 is dominant for both

16

Prisoner's dilemma

Change the game, not the exhortation

  1. Repetition: punish undercutting tomorrow.
  2. Commitment: binding promise to match any price.
  3. Changing the game: eliminate the prisoners' dilemma.
17

A new game

What to play now?

18

Nash equilibrium

Nobody wants to deviate

Nash equilibrium. An action profile is a Nash equilibrium if no player has an incentive to make a unilateral deviation.

19

Nash equilibrium

Label the best responses

20

Ballet or opera?

How many equilibria?

21

Four classic 2×2 games

How many equilibria?

GamePure equilibriaThe problem
Prisoner's dilemmaPlayer 2LeftRightPlayer 1Up300, 3000, 400Down400, 0200, 200OneBoth would like to escape it
Pure coordinationPlayer 2LeftRightPlayer 1Up5, 50, 0Down0, 05, 5Two, ranked the sameBeliefs: expect the same place
ChickenPlayer 2LeftRightPlayer 1Up5, 51, 10Down10, 10, 0, battle of the sexesPlayer 2LeftRightPlayer 1Up3, 10, 0Down0, 01, 3Two, ranked differentlyWho gets their way
Matching penniesPlayer 2LeftRightPlayer 1Up1, −1−1, 1Down−1, 11, −1NoneDon't be predictable
22

In class

Find the Nash equilibria

23

Sequential games

Players move in sequence

What happens when the rival sees your moves?

24

Game trees

Reading a game tree

25

Sequential games

What is a strategy?

Strategy. A player's behavior is described by a complete contingency plan indicating the action chosen at each decision node where the player is supposed to act. This is called a strategy.

26

The catwalk game

27

A strategy is a plan

DownUnder's four strategies

StrategyAfter SportyAfter Classical
EEEuropeanEuropean
EOEuropeanOutback
OEOutbackEuropean
OOOutbackOutback
28

As a matrix

Three Nash equilibria

29

(C, OO)

"Outback, whatever you launch"

If Allure launches Sporty anyway, DownUnder gets 3 from Outback and 4 from European.

Should Allure believe the threat?
30

Credible threat

One you'd want to carry out when the time comes

Stating a threat doesn't make it credible. The payoff from carrying it out does.

31

Backward induction

Solve from the end

  1. At each last decision, find the best action.
  2. Replace the decision with its outcome.
  3. Repeat until the first move.
32

Backward induction

Solve the catwalk game

33

Centipede

Stop or continue?

34

Ultimatum game

Split $10

The proposer offers a share. If the responder rejects, both get nothing.

What's the smallest offer you'd accept?
35

Ultimatum game

36

Repeated games

Playing repeatedly

The same rivals, every period.

37

The stage game

A prisoner's dilemma, every period

38

Repeated game

The stage game, every period

  1. In every period \(t\), players play the stage game.
  2. The outcome of the stage game in period \(t\) determines each player's stage payoffs.
  3. Stage payoffs arrive every period. The payoff of the repeated game aggregates them.
39

Infinitely repeated games

No last period

There's no well-defined final period, so backward induction has no natural point to start.

40

Discounting

A stream of $1 in every period

\(\displaystyle 1+\delta+\delta^2+\cdots=\frac{1}{1-\delta}\)

With \(\delta=0.9\), a dollar every period is worth 10 today.

41

Grim trigger

Consider the following strategy

  1. In period 1, I play C.
  2. In period \(t=2,3,\ldots\), I play C if my opponent has always played C. Otherwise, I switch to D forever.
42

Grim trigger

Cooperate until anyone defects, then defect forever

Deviating earns 5 in period \(t\), then 1 a period. Cooperating earns 3 a period.

How patient must Alice be to keep cooperating?
43

Grim trigger

What does Alice gain by deviating?

Bob plays grim trigger.

AliceOutcomesPayoff
Cooperates(C, C), (C, C), (C, C), …\(V_C=3+3\delta+3\delta^2+\cdots=\dfrac{3}{1-\delta}\)
Deviates(D, C), (D, D), (D, D), …\(V_D=5+\delta+\delta^2+\cdots=5+\dfrac{\delta}{1-\delta}\)
44

Alice's comparison

Cooperate or deviate?

\(\displaystyle \begin{aligned}\frac{3}{1-\delta}&\geq5+\frac{\delta}{1-\delta}\\ 3&\geq5(1-\delta)+\delta\\ 3&\geq5-4\delta\\ \delta&\geq\tfrac12\end{aligned}\)
45

Tit-for-tat

Consider the following strategy

  1. In period 1, I play C.
  2. In period \(t=2,3,\ldots\), I play whatever my opponent played in period \(t-1\).
46

Tit-for-tat

What does Alice gain by deviating?

Bob plays tit-for-tat.

AliceOutcomesPayoff
Cooperates(C, C), (C, C), (C, C), …\(V_C=3+3\delta+3\delta^2+\cdots\)
Deviates once(D, C), (C, D), (C, C), …\(V_1=5+0\cdot\delta+3\delta^2+\cdots\)
Deviates forever(D, C), (D, D), (D, D), …\(V_D=5+\delta+\delta^2+\cdots=5+\dfrac{\delta}{1-\delta}\)
47

Alice's comparison

Cooperate or deviate once?

\(\displaystyle \begin{aligned}3+3\delta&\geq5+0\cdot\delta\\ 3\delta&\geq2\\ \delta&\geq\tfrac23\end{aligned}\)

Deviating forever needs \(\delta\geq\frac{1}{2}\), as under grim trigger. Both must hold.

48

Grim trigger and tit-for-tat

How much patience?

StrategyPunishmentCooperation needs
Grim triggerDefect forever\(\delta\geq\frac{1}{2}\)
Tit-for-tatDefect for one period\(\delta\geq\frac{2}{3}\)

A milder punishment never needs less patience.

49

The shadow of the future

Cooperation needs a future that matters

Frequent interaction, a lasting relationship and no known last period.

50

Assignment for Quiz 7

Hats

Akubra and Barmah set prices, first at the same time, then with a promise to match.

51