Managerial Economics · Week 6
Thinking strategically
How do we act when outcomes depend on others?
What is a decision problem?
Action determines the outcome
One person chooses an action from a set of alternatives to achieve their objective.
What is a strategic problem?
Actions determine the outcome
Two or more people, each with their own objective, choose actions. The outcome depends on what everyone chooses.
A game
Anatomy of a game
- Players: who decides.
- Strategies: what each can do.
- Outcomes: what each combination of strategies leads to.
- Payoffs: what each outcome is worth to each player.
- Rules: who moves when, and who sees what.
Players' behavior
What does rational mean?
Payoffs capture how a player ranks outcomes. Each player maximizes their payoff given what they know and what they conjecture about the others.
Timing
Simultaneous or sequential
No player sees the others' moves before choosing.
Payoff matrixLater players see earlier moves.
Game treeTiming
Simultaneous or sequential
Information
Complete or incomplete
Every player knows the entire structure of the game.
At least one player is uncertain about the ingredients of the game, such as a rival's payoffs.
Two cafés across the street
$4 or $6 a cup?
100 price-sensitive customers a day go to the cheaper café. If the prices are equal, the cafés split the market equally.
Two cafés
Pricing game
Dominant strategy
Higher payoff against every action of the rival
No guessing needed. If you have one, play it.
Dominant strategy. For a player, an action is dominant if it yields at least as high a payoff as any other action, regardless of what the other players do.
Two cafés, a variant
Pricing game
Dominated strategy
What won't Player 1 play?
Dominated strategy
Another strategy does better against every action of the rival
A rational player never plays a dominated strategy, so we can delete it.
Dominated strategy. For a player, an action is dominated if another action yields a higher payoff, regardless of what the other players do.
Iterated elimination
Eliminating dominated strategies
Prisoners' dilemma
$4 is dominant for both
Prisoner's dilemma
Change the game, not the exhortation
- Repetition: punish undercutting tomorrow.
- Commitment: binding promise to match any price.
- Changing the game: eliminate the prisoners' dilemma.
A new game
What to play now?
Nash equilibrium
Nobody wants to deviate
Nash equilibrium. An action profile is a Nash equilibrium if no player has an incentive to make a unilateral deviation.
Nash equilibrium
Label the best responses
Ballet or opera?
How many equilibria?
Four classic 2×2 games
How many equilibria?
| Game | Pure equilibria | The problem |
|---|---|---|
| Prisoner's dilemmaPlayer 2LeftRightPlayer 1Up300, 3000, 400Down400, 0200, 200 | One | Both would like to escape it |
| Pure coordinationPlayer 2LeftRightPlayer 1Up5, 50, 0Down0, 05, 5 | Two, ranked the same | Beliefs: expect the same place |
| ChickenPlayer 2LeftRightPlayer 1Up5, 51, 10Down10, 10, 0, battle of the sexesPlayer 2LeftRightPlayer 1Up3, 10, 0Down0, 01, 3 | Two, ranked differently | Who gets their way |
| Matching penniesPlayer 2LeftRightPlayer 1Up1, −1−1, 1Down−1, 11, −1 | None | Don't be predictable |
In class
Find the Nash equilibria
Sequential games
Players move in sequence
What happens when the rival sees your moves?
Game trees
Reading a game tree
Sequential games
What is a strategy?
Strategy. A player's behavior is described by a complete contingency plan indicating the action chosen at each decision node where the player is supposed to act. This is called a strategy.
The catwalk game
A strategy is a plan
DownUnder's four strategies
| Strategy | After Sporty | After Classical |
|---|---|---|
| EE | European | European |
| EO | European | Outback |
| OE | Outback | European |
| OO | Outback | Outback |
As a matrix
Three Nash equilibria
(C, OO)
"Outback, whatever you launch"
If Allure launches Sporty anyway, DownUnder gets 3 from Outback and 4 from European.
Credible threat
One you'd want to carry out when the time comes
Stating a threat doesn't make it credible. The payoff from carrying it out does.
Backward induction
Solve from the end
- At each last decision, find the best action.
- Replace the decision with its outcome.
- Repeat until the first move.
Backward induction
Solve the catwalk game
Centipede
Stop or continue?
Ultimatum game
Split $10
The proposer offers a share. If the responder rejects, both get nothing.
Ultimatum game
Repeated games
Playing repeatedly
The same rivals, every period.
The stage game
A prisoner's dilemma, every period
Repeated game
The stage game, every period
- In every period \(t\), players play the stage game.
- The outcome of the stage game in period \(t\) determines each player's stage payoffs.
- Stage payoffs arrive every period. The payoff of the repeated game aggregates them.
Infinitely repeated games
No last period
There's no well-defined final period, so backward induction has no natural point to start.
Discounting
A stream of $1 in every period
With \(\delta=0.9\), a dollar every period is worth 10 today.
Grim trigger
Consider the following strategy
- In period 1, I play C.
- In period \(t=2,3,\ldots\), I play C if my opponent has always played C. Otherwise, I switch to D forever.
Grim trigger
Cooperate until anyone defects, then defect forever
Deviating earns 5 in period \(t\), then 1 a period. Cooperating earns 3 a period.
Grim trigger
What does Alice gain by deviating?
Bob plays grim trigger.
| Alice | Outcomes | Payoff |
|---|---|---|
| Cooperates | (C, C), (C, C), (C, C), … | \(V_C=3+3\delta+3\delta^2+\cdots=\dfrac{3}{1-\delta}\) |
| Deviates | (D, C), (D, D), (D, D), … | \(V_D=5+\delta+\delta^2+\cdots=5+\dfrac{\delta}{1-\delta}\) |
Alice's comparison
Cooperate or deviate?
Tit-for-tat
Consider the following strategy
- In period 1, I play C.
- In period \(t=2,3,\ldots\), I play whatever my opponent played in period \(t-1\).
Tit-for-tat
What does Alice gain by deviating?
Bob plays tit-for-tat.
| Alice | Outcomes | Payoff |
|---|---|---|
| Cooperates | (C, C), (C, C), (C, C), … | \(V_C=3+3\delta+3\delta^2+\cdots\) |
| Deviates once | (D, C), (C, D), (C, C), … | \(V_1=5+0\cdot\delta+3\delta^2+\cdots\) |
| Deviates forever | (D, C), (D, D), (D, D), … | \(V_D=5+\delta+\delta^2+\cdots=5+\dfrac{\delta}{1-\delta}\) |
Alice's comparison
Cooperate or deviate once?
Deviating forever needs \(\delta\geq\frac{1}{2}\), as under grim trigger. Both must hold.
Grim trigger and tit-for-tat
How much patience?
| Strategy | Punishment | Cooperation needs |
|---|---|---|
| Grim trigger | Defect forever | \(\delta\geq\frac{1}{2}\) |
| Tit-for-tat | Defect for one period | \(\delta\geq\frac{2}{3}\) |
A milder punishment never needs less patience.
The shadow of the future
Cooperation needs a future that matters
Frequent interaction, a lasting relationship and no known last period.
Assignment for Quiz 7
Hats
Akubra and Barmah set prices, first at the same time, then with a promise to match.