Managerial Economics · Week 5
Pricing
How should a firm use the information about its customers?
Back to Ride On
Uniform pricing
Some kids would pay $3. Some would pay $1, more than the 50-cent marginal cost.
Triangles of opportunity
Above the price and below it
Kids who'd pay more keep their surplus.
\(CS=45\)Rides worth more than 50 cents that never happen.
\(DWL=45\)Price discrimination
Three conditions
- Market power.
- A way to separate buyers.
- No arbitrage: no resale, no switching groups.
Classification
What does the firm know?
| Degree | What the firm knows | Example |
|---|---|---|
| First: personalized pricing | Each customer's value | A negotiated price |
| Second: menu pricing | Nothing about the individual, so customers choose | Fare classes, a Lite version |
| Third: group pricing | A characteristic, not the value | Senior tickets, booking channel |
Not every price gap
Compare markups, not prices
A price difference that matches a cost difference isn't discrimination.
First degree
Personalized pricing
What if Ride On knew each kid's value of each ride?
Ride On
Ten identical kids
Each kid: \(q^d(p)=14-4p\)
Market: \(Q^d(p)=140-40p\)
\(MC=0.5\), daily rental 40
Uniform pricing: 6 rides per kid at $2, profit 50
Personalized pricing
Every ride at its value
Each kid pays, for each ride, exactly what it's worth to them.
First degree
The efficient quantity, all to Ride On
Consumer surplus 0. Deadweight loss 0.
In practice
Why first degree is rare
- The firm must know each value.
- Buyers hide high values.
- Buyers compare prices, get angry and resell.
A two-part tariff
Sell a day pass
A fixed fee, then a per-unit fee for each ride.
Ride On
One kid, ten passes
Lower the per-unit fee
| Per-unit fee | Rides | Fixed fee | Ride margin | Profit |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2.00 | 6 | 4.50 | 9.00 | 95 |
| 1.00 | 10 | 12.50 | 5.00 | 135 |
| 0.50 | 12 | 18.00 | 0.00 | 140 |
Per kid, fixed fee plus margin is \(18-2(p-0.5)^2\).
Where the formula comes from
Fixed fee plus ride margin, per kid
18 is the whole surplus at cost. \(2(p-0.5)^2\) is the deadweight-loss triangle.
Two-part tariff
Per-unit fee at cost, fixed fee for access
A per-unit fee at marginal cost makes the surplus as large as possible. The fixed fee collects it.
Your electricity bill
A two-part tariff
Fixed fee: supply charge, $1.2386 a day
Per-unit fee: 45.13 cents per kWh
Also: gyms, warehouse clubs, printers and ink
When kids differ
Surpluses of $18 and $32
Occasional kids and regulars.
Block pricing
$2 for 6 rides, then $1
The price per ride changes with the number of rides: $2 for each of the first 6, $1 for every ride after that.
| Scheme | Rides | Profit | Consumer surplus |
|---|---|---|---|
| Uniform pricing, $2 | 60 | 50 | 45 |
| Blocks | 100 | 70 | 65 |
| Pass, rides at cost | 120 | 140 | 0 |
The cheap block only discounts rides kids wouldn't otherwise take.
Second degree
Pricing by menu
The firm cannot observe individual characteristics of customers.
It offers a menu.
The Flying Koala
Melbourne to Sydney
| Restricted | Unrestricted | |
|---|---|---|
| Tourist WTP (7,000) | $140 | $175 |
| Business WTP (3,000) | $225 | $300 |
| Cost | $100 | $150 |
The airline can tell them apart
Two ticket counters
One counter for tourists and one for business travelers. In principle, four prices: \(p^t_r\), \(p^t_u\), \(p^b_r\) and \(p^b_u\).
The Flying Koala
Two ticket counters
Price at WTP, sell the higher margin
Charge each group its WTP. A lower price gives up margin, and a higher price loses the customer.
| Margin per ticket | Restricted | Unrestricted | Sell |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tourists | \(140-100=40\) | \(175-150=25\) | Restricted, $140 |
| Business | \(225-100=125\) | \(300-150=150\) | Unrestricted, $300 |
Profit: \(7{,}000\times40+3{,}000\times150=730{,}000\).
Koala cannot tell them apart
Fares of \(p_r=\$140\) and \(p_u=\$300\)
Now there is one counter, and every passenger picks a fare.
At the ideal prices
What tourists do
| Tourists | Restricted, \(\$140\) | Unrestricted, \(\$300\) |
|---|---|---|
| WTP | \(\$140\) | \(\$175\) |
| Price | \(\$140\) | \(\$300\) |
| Surplus | \(140-140=0\) + ![]() | \(175-300=-125\) |
Tourists buy restricted. The unrestricted fare costs more than it's worth to them.
At the ideal prices
What business travelers do
| Business travelers | Restricted, \(\$140\) | Unrestricted, \(\$300\) |
|---|---|---|
| WTP | \(\$225\) | \(\$300\) |
| Price | \(\$140\) | \(\$300\) |
| Surplus | \(225-140=85\) | \(300-300=0\) |
Business travelers buy restricted too. It leaves them \(\$85\), and the unrestricted fare leaves nothing.
It doesn't work the same way
Everybody buys restricted
At \(p_r=\$140\) and \(p_u=\$300\), everybody pays \(\$140\).
Profit is \(10{,}000\times(140-100)=\$400{,}000\).
Incentive compatibility
To incentivize business travelers to buy unrestricted

Check the alternative
Screen or business only?
Restricted at $140, unrestricted at $215.
\(475{,}000\)Unrestricted at $300, no tourists.
\(450{,}000\)Information rent
The high type keeps $85
It's what the airline pays to make business travelers reveal themselves.
Which menu does The Flying Koala prefer if there are 5,000 business travelers and 5,000 tourists?
Ride On, when kids differ
A menu of day passes
Five occasional riders, \(q=14-4p\). Five regulars, \(q=18-4p\).
Rental is \(\$40\) a day, and each ride costs \(\$0.50\).
| Scheme | Occasional keep | Regulars keep |
|---|---|---|
| $18 pass, 50 cents a ride | 0 | 14 |
| $12.50 pass, $1 a ride | 0 | 12 |
| Menu: $8 pass, $1.50 a ride, or $22 pass, 50 cents a ride | 0 | 10 |
Which scheme earns the most?
Other ways to build a menu
Customers reveal themselves
| Tool | How it works |
|---|---|
| Versioning | A limited version sells for less |
| Mixed bundling | Sold alone and as a cheaper package |
| Coupons | Effort earns the discount |
| Timing | The price depends on when you buy |
| Quantity | A lower unit price for larger purchases |
Book Oasis
Name the tool
- A Lite e-reader at a lower price.
- The e-reader with ebooks, at a discount.
- A voucher code for 15% off.
- A price cut over Christmas.
- A free protective case with every e-reader.
Third degree
Pricing by group
The firm sees a label: age, country, booking channel.
Third degree
What group pricing needs
- Segment customers by price sensitivity.
- Identify each customer's group.
- No arbitrage opportunities.
In-class exercise
A Fashion Statement
Young: $120 a sweater, \(\varepsilon=-1.2\)
Mature: $340 a sweater, \(\varepsilon\approx-5.67\)
Same cost in both chains
Sell more sweaters to the young, or fewer?
Pasta Couture
Compare marginal revenues
\(20\lt280\): move sweaters from the young to the mature.
Third degree
Allocate, then price
- Allocate output so that \(MR_A=MR_B\).
- Expand until the common \(MR=MC\).
- Read each price off its own demand.
From marginal revenue to prices
Equal marginal revenues, unequal prices
With \(\varepsilon_A=-3\) and \(\varepsilon_B=-1.5\), \(p_A/p_B=\frac12\).
The markup rule, group by group
The more elastic group pays less
Not the group with the smaller demand.
Pasta Couture, full demands
Each market at \(MR=MC=50\)
Profit 24,237,500 a year.
Elasticity belongs to a point
The order flips at the optimum
| Old price | Elasticity | Optimal price | Elasticity | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Young | $120 | −1.2 | $135 | −1.59 |
| Mature | $340 | −5.7 | $225 | −1.29 |
Apply the rule where the firm ends up.
Kangaroo Island
Southern Ocean Lodge
\(Q^d(p)=700-2.5p\), \(MC=80\)
200 rooms
Uniform pricing: \(MR(200)=120>80\), all 200 rooms at $200
Two channels
Phone and internet
Without the limit: 80 phone rooms and 170 internet rooms.
Southern Ocean Lodge
Only 200 rooms
Phone bookers are less price-sensitive.
Southern Ocean Lodge
Capacity binds
Equal marginal revenues, all rooms sold
Common \(MR=120>MC=80\).
Who wins?
Uniform pricing against two prices
| Uniform pricing | Two prices | |
|---|---|---|
| Phone | $200, 100 rooms | $260, 70 rooms |
| Internet | $200, 100 rooms | $185, 130 rooms |
| Consumer surplus | 12,500 | 9,125 |
| Revenue | 40,000 | 42,250 |
Same 200 rooms: total surplus falls by 1,125.
Welfare
Is discrimination bad for buyers?
Personalized pricing, a pass at cost, blocks, the Flying Koala.
Deadweight loss fallsSouthern Ocean Lodge, Pasta Couture.
Total surplus fallsThird degree and welfare
For total surplus to rise, output has to rise
With the same output, discrimination can only move units to buyers who value them less.
Opening a market
A drug at two prices
Cost $10 a dose
One million patients at $100, one million at $30
Uniform pricing: $100 earns $90m, $30 earns $40m
Two prices: output doubles, profit rises by $20m
Who gains from the screen?
The Flying Koala
| Best single fare, $300 | Screen | |
|---|---|---|
| Airline profit | 450,000 | 475,000 |
| Business surplus | 0 | 255,000 |
| Tourist surplus | 0 | 0 |
| Total surplus | 450,000 | 730,000 |
Seven thousand more trips, each worth $40 more than it costs.
Assignment for Quiz 5
Cigarex
Price a drug in two markets, then again after generic entry.
