Managerial Economics · Week 5

Pricing

How should a firm use the information about its customers?

1

Back to Ride On

Uniform pricing

Some kids would pay $3. Some would pay $1, more than the 50-cent marginal cost.

What is uniform pricing leaving on the table?
2

Triangles of opportunity

Above the price and below it

Above $2

Kids who'd pay more keep their surplus.

\(CS=45\)
Below $2, above cost

Rides worth more than 50 cents that never happen.

\(DWL=45\)
3

Price discrimination

Three conditions

  1. Market power.
  2. A way to separate buyers.
  3. No arbitrage: no resale, no switching groups.
4

Classification

What does the firm know?

DegreeWhat the firm knowsExample
First: personalized pricingEach customer's valueA negotiated price
Second: menu pricingNothing about the individual, so customers chooseFare classes, a Lite version
Third: group pricingA characteristic, not the valueSenior tickets, booking channel
5

Not every price gap

Compare markups, not prices

A price difference that matches a cost difference isn't discrimination.

6

First degree

Personalized pricing

What if Ride On knew each kid's value of each ride?

7

Ride On

Ten identical kids

Each kid: \(q^d(p)=14-4p\)

Market: \(Q^d(p)=140-40p\)

\(MC=0.5\), daily rental 40

Uniform pricing: 6 rides per kid at $2, profit 50

8

Personalized pricing

Every ride at its value

Each kid pays, for each ride, exactly what it's worth to them.

How many rides? What profit?
9

First degree

The efficient quantity, all to Ride On

\(\displaystyle \begin{aligned}Q&=120\\ \pi&=\tfrac12\times120\times3-40\\ &=140\end{aligned}\)

Consumer surplus 0. Deadweight loss 0.

10

In practice

Why first degree is rare

  1. The firm must know each value.
  2. Buyers hide high values.
  3. Buyers compare prices, get angry and resell.
11

A two-part tariff

Sell a day pass

A fixed fee, then a per-unit fee for each ride.

What per-unit fee should Ride On set?
12

Ride On

13

One kid, ten passes

Lower the per-unit fee

Per-unit feeRidesFixed feeRide marginProfit
2.0064.509.0095
1.001012.505.00135
0.501218.000.00140

Per kid, fixed fee plus margin is \(18-2(p-0.5)^2\).

14

Where the formula comes from

Fixed fee plus ride margin, per kid

\(\displaystyle \begin{aligned}\text{Fixed fee}&=\tfrac12(14-4p)(3.5-p)\\ \text{Ride margin}&=(p-0.5)(14-4p)\\ \text{Sum}&=18-2(p-0.5)^2\end{aligned}\)

18 is the whole surplus at cost. \(2(p-0.5)^2\) is the deadweight-loss triangle.

15

Two-part tariff

Per-unit fee at cost, fixed fee for access

A per-unit fee at marginal cost makes the surplus as large as possible. The fixed fee collects it.

16

Your electricity bill

A two-part tariff

Fixed fee: supply charge, $1.2386 a day

Per-unit fee: 45.13 cents per kWh

Also: gyms, warehouse clubs, printers and ink

An electricity bill for 12 March to 11 June 2026. From 12 March to 29 April, Peak Consumption is 174.851 kWh at $0.451264, or $78.90, Dedicated Circuit Consumption is 206.081 kWh at $0.22407, or $46.18, and the Supply Charge is 49 days at $1.2386, or $60.69. From 30 April to 11 June, the rates are $0.40172 and $0.178002 per kWh and $1.1132 a day. It also lists a solar buyback credit at $0.04 per kWh.Per-unit fee. 174.851 kWh × $0.451264 per kWh = $78.90. The more you use, the more you pay.Fixed fee. 49 days × $1.2386 a day = $60.69. It depends on the days in the period, not on how much you use.
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When kids differ

Surpluses of $18 and $32

Occasional kids and regulars.

Can one fixed fee collect both?
18

Block pricing

$2 for 6 rides, then $1

The price per ride changes with the number of rides: $2 for each of the first 6, $1 for every ride after that.

SchemeRidesProfitConsumer surplus
Uniform pricing, $2605045
Blocks1007065
Pass, rides at cost1201400

The cheap block only discounts rides kids wouldn't otherwise take.

19

Second degree

Pricing by menu

The firm cannot observe individual characteristics of customers.
It offers a menu.

20

The Flying Koala

Melbourne to Sydney

RestrictedUnrestricted
Tourist WTP (7,000)$140$175
Business WTP (3,000)$225$300
Cost$100$150
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The airline can tell them apart

Two ticket counters

One counter for tourists and one for business travelers. In principle, four prices: \(p^t_r\), \(p^t_u\), \(p^b_r\) and \(p^b_u\).

How should the airline set them?
22

The Flying Koala

23

Two ticket counters

Price at WTP, sell the higher margin

Charge each group its WTP. A lower price gives up margin, and a higher price loses the customer.

Margin per ticketRestrictedUnrestrictedSell
Tourists\(140-100=40\)\(175-150=25\)Restricted, $140
Business\(225-100=125\)\(300-150=150\)Unrestricted, $300

Profit: \(7{,}000\times40+3{,}000\times150=730{,}000\).

24

Koala cannot tell them apart

Fares of \(p_r=\$140\) and \(p_u=\$300\)

Now there is one counter, and every passenger picks a fare.

What do customers buy?
25

At the ideal prices

What tourists do

TouristsRestricted, \(\$140\)Unrestricted, \(\$300\)
WTP\(\$140\)\(\$175\)
Price\(\$140\)\(\$300\)
Surplus\(140-140=0\) + a cup of coffee\(175-300=-125\)

Tourists buy restricted. The unrestricted fare costs more than it's worth to them.

26

At the ideal prices

What business travelers do

Business travelersRestricted, \(\$140\)Unrestricted, \(\$300\)
WTP\(\$225\)\(\$300\)
Price\(\$140\)\(\$300\)
Surplus\(225-140=85\)\(300-300=0\)

Business travelers buy restricted too. It leaves them \(\$85\), and the unrestricted fare leaves nothing.

27

It doesn't work the same way

Everybody buys restricted

At \(p_r=\$140\) and \(p_u=\$300\), everybody pays \(\$140\).
Profit is \(10{,}000\times(140-100)=\$400{,}000\).

Can Koala do better than that?
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Incentive compatibility

To incentivize business travelers to buy unrestricted

\(\text{CS from unrestricted}\)\(\geq\)\(\text{CS from restricted}\)\(300-p_u\)\(\geq\)\(225-140\)\(p_u\)\(\leq\)\(215\)\(p_u\)\(=\)\(215\) + a cup of coffee
\(\displaystyle \begin{aligned}\pi&=7{,}000\times40+3{,}000\times65\\ &=475{,}000\end{aligned}\)
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Check the alternative

Screen or business only?

Screen

Restricted at $140, unrestricted at $215.

\(475{,}000\)
Business only

Unrestricted at $300, no tourists.

\(450{,}000\)
30

Information rent

The high type keeps $85

It's what the airline pays to make business travelers reveal themselves.

31

Which menu does The Flying Koala prefer if there are 5,000 business travelers and 5,000 tourists?

32

Ride On, when kids differ

A menu of day passes

Five occasional riders, \(q=14-4p\). Five regulars, \(q=18-4p\).
Rental is \(\$40\) a day, and each ride costs \(\$0.50\).

SchemeOccasional keepRegulars keep
$18 pass, 50 cents a ride014
$12.50 pass, $1 a ride012
Menu: $8 pass, $1.50 a ride, or $22 pass, 50 cents a ride010

Which scheme earns the most?

33

Other ways to build a menu

Customers reveal themselves

ToolHow it works
VersioningA limited version sells for less
Mixed bundlingSold alone and as a cheaper package
CouponsEffort earns the discount
TimingThe price depends on when you buy
QuantityA lower unit price for larger purchases
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Book Oasis

Name the tool

  1. A Lite e-reader at a lower price.
  2. The e-reader with ebooks, at a discount.
  3. A voucher code for 15% off.
  4. A price cut over Christmas.
  5. A free protective case with every e-reader.
35

Third degree

Pricing by group

The firm sees a label: age, country, booking channel.

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Third degree

What group pricing needs

  1. Segment customers by price sensitivity.
  2. Identify each customer's group.
  3. No arbitrage opportunities.
37

In-class exercise

A Fashion Statement

Young: $120 a sweater, \(\varepsilon=-1.2\)

Mature: $340 a sweater, \(\varepsilon\approx-5.67\)

Same cost in both chains

Sell more sweaters to the young, or fewer?

38

Pasta Couture

Compare marginal revenues

\(\displaystyle \begin{aligned}MR_y&=120\left(1-\frac{1}{1.2}\right)\\ &=20\\[.5em] MR_m&=340\left(1-\frac{1}{5.67}\right)\\ &\approx280\end{aligned}\)

\(20\lt280\): move sweaters from the young to the mature.

39

Third degree

Allocate, then price

  1. Allocate output so that \(MR_A=MR_B\).
  2. Expand until the common \(MR=MC\).
  3. Read each price off its own demand.
40

From marginal revenue to prices

Equal marginal revenues, unequal prices

\(\displaystyle \begin{aligned}p_A\left(1+\frac{1}{\varepsilon_A}\right)&=p_B\left(1+\frac{1}{\varepsilon_B}\right)\\ \frac{p_A}{p_B}&=\frac{1+1/\varepsilon_B}{1+1/\varepsilon_A}\end{aligned}\)

With \(\varepsilon_A=-3\) and \(\varepsilon_B=-1.5\), \(p_A/p_B=\frac12\).

41

The markup rule, group by group

The more elastic group pays less

Not the group with the smaller demand.

42

Pasta Couture, full demands

Each market at \(MR=MC=50\)

\(\displaystyle \begin{aligned}220-\frac{q_y}{250}&=50\\ q_y&=42{,}500\\ p_y&=135\end{aligned}\)
\(\displaystyle \begin{aligned}400-\frac{q_m}{500}&=50\\ q_m&=175{,}000\\ p_m&=225\end{aligned}\)

Profit 24,237,500 a year.

43

Elasticity belongs to a point

The order flips at the optimum

Old priceElasticityOptimal priceElasticity
Young$120−1.2$135−1.59
Mature$340−5.7$225−1.29

Apply the rule where the firm ends up.

44

Kangaroo Island

Southern Ocean Lodge

\(Q^d(p)=700-2.5p\), \(MC=80\)

200 rooms

Uniform pricing: \(MR(200)=120>80\), all 200 rooms at $200

45

Two channels

Phone and internet

\(\displaystyle \begin{aligned}q_t&=200-0.5p_t\\ MR_t&=400-4q_t\end{aligned}\)
\(\displaystyle \begin{aligned}q_i&=500-2p_i\\ MR_i&=250-q_i\end{aligned}\)

Without the limit: 80 phone rooms and 170 internet rooms.

46

Southern Ocean Lodge

Only 200 rooms

Phone bookers are less price-sensitive.

Who gets the rooms, and at what prices?
47

Southern Ocean Lodge

48

Capacity binds

Equal marginal revenues, all rooms sold

\(\displaystyle \begin{aligned}400-4q_t&=250-q_i\\ q_t+q_i&=200\\ q_t&=70,\ q_i=130\end{aligned}\)
\(\displaystyle \begin{aligned}p_t&=260\\ p_i&=185\end{aligned}\)

Common \(MR=120>MC=80\).

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Who wins?

Uniform pricing against two prices

Uniform pricingTwo prices
Phone$200, 100 rooms$260, 70 rooms
Internet$200, 100 rooms$185, 130 rooms
Consumer surplus12,5009,125
Revenue40,00042,250

Same 200 rooms: total surplus falls by 1,125.

50

Welfare

Is discrimination bad for buyers?

More trades

Personalized pricing, a pass at cost, blocks, the Flying Koala.

Deadweight loss falls
Same trades

Southern Ocean Lodge, Pasta Couture.

Total surplus falls
51

Third degree and welfare

For total surplus to rise, output has to rise

With the same output, discrimination can only move units to buyers who value them less.

52

Opening a market

A drug at two prices

Cost $10 a dose

One million patients at $100, one million at $30

Uniform pricing: $100 earns $90m, $30 earns $40m

Two prices: output doubles, profit rises by $20m

53

Who gains from the screen?

The Flying Koala

Best single fare, $300Screen
Airline profit450,000475,000
Business surplus0255,000
Tourist surplus00
Total surplus450,000730,000

Seven thousand more trips, each worth $40 more than it costs.

54

Assignment for Quiz 5

Cigarex

Price a drug in two markets, then again after generic entry.

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