Demand for oranges on Portakal is \(Q^d(p)=3{,}100-100p\). Each island farm has cost \(C_I(q)=100+q+q^2\), with minimum average cost of 21 at \(q=10\). Land and regulation allow no more than fifty island farms.
Week 3: In-class
Orange Farming on Portakal
Question 1
Show that the fifty-farm cap binds. Then find the competitive equilibrium with only island farms and calculate one farm's economic profit.
Reveal the solution
With free entry by identical island farms, the long-run price would be 21. Demand at that price is \(3{,}100-100\times21=1{,}000\). Since each farm produces ten, the market would need 100 farms. The cap of fifty therefore binds.
Above 21, one farm supplies \((p-1)/2\), so fifty farms supply \(25p-25\). Equilibrium is
Each farm produces twelve. Its profit is
Question 2
Mainland farms may now ship oranges to Portakal. They have cost \(C_M(q)=100+3q+q^2\) and free entry. Find the new long-run price, market quantity, island output, mainland output and number of mainland farms.
Reveal the solution
A mainland farm's minimum average cost is 23 at an output of ten. Free mainland entry therefore pins the long-run price at 23.
Demand at 23 is 800. Each island farm sets \(23=1+2q\), so it produces eleven. Fifty island farms supply 550. Mainland farms supply the remaining \(800-550=250\). Each produces ten, so twenty-five mainland farms enter.
Question 3
Calculate the profit of an island farm and a mainland farm in Question 2. Why can their profits differ in a competitive equilibrium?
Reveal the solution
A mainland farm produces ten at its minimum average cost of 23, so its economic profit is zero.
An island farm produces eleven and earns
Both types take the same market price as given. Their profits differ because island farms have a cost advantage: they don't pay the $2 transportation cost. Free entry removes profit for the marginal mainland technology, but entrants cannot copy the scarce low-cost island location.